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Small businesses shoulder significant costs in order to comply with the 
maze of government regulation that impacts commerce.  The Regulatory 
Flexibility Act (RFA) was designed to alleviate that burden by making 
regulators more accountable in their enforcement of agency mandates.  
The RFA just celebrated its thirtieth birthday, and despite being one of the 
most important pieces of business legislation, it has yet to fulfill its 
promise.  This article examines not just the calls for statutory reform, but 
also the motivations and perceptions of the individuals most impacted by 
business regulation.  We propose that while legal reform can be helpful, 
actions can be taken from both sides of the regulation equation to make the 
regulatory environment less hostile to small business while still 
substantially meeting agency goals.  The underlying theme is that increased 
interactivity by both the government and the governed, and not simply 
statutory reform, will be most effective in bringing the long-delayed 
potential of the RFA to fruition. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In 1980, during the waning days of the Carter administration and 
while the Iranian hostage crises captured the attention of America, 
Congress quietly passed (and the President signed) some of the most 
influential business legislation of the decade.  This legislation was 
influential not because it was yet another law designed to reign in business 
practices.  Rather, the legislation was so influential because its purpose was 
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to do quite the opposite, by helping vulnerable small companies interact 
with the very regulation and regulators that made doing business so 
challenging. 
That legislation, known today as the Regulatory Flexibility Act 
(RFA), had the potential to fundamentally reshape how regulators 
interpreted, applied, and enforced the tens of thousands of rules and 
dictates that impact American commerce.  The RFA would force 
administrative agencies to weigh the outcome of their actions.  More 
importantly, it would also create a climate of interactivity between small 
business leaders and regulators that never before existed in the federal 
system.  This interactivity gave the RFA the power to fundamentally 
redefine the relationship between government and governed.  The RFA also 
has the distinction of being one of the least-examined pieces of business 
legislation, relative to its potential influence, in the past thirty years. 
In short, the RFA represents a concerted effort to reduce 
administrative burdens by compelling federal agencies to take small firm 
concerns into account as part of the rulemaking process.
1
  The RFA 
requires, among other things, that an administrative agency promulgating a 
rule certify that a regulation will not significantly harm a substantial 
number of small businesses.  If the agency cannot certify this, then it must 
conduct a deeper analysis examining the rule‘s negative impact on small 
businesses and possible methods of reducing that burden.
2
  The RFA‘s goal 
was meant to be nothing less than a culture shift in federal bureaucracy 
towards an appreciation of the value of small businesses.  It was designed 




Yet thirty years later, controversy over the effectiveness of the RFA 
continues, and the need for reform has never been more pressing.  Small 
businesses continue to suffer disproportionately from the cost of 
regulations.  According to a recent study, small businesses (defined as 
firms with twenty or fewer employees) faced an annual regulatory cost of 
$10,585 per employee, thirty-six percent more than the regulatory cost 
facing large businesses (defined as firms with five hundred or more 
employees).
4
  The promised sensitivity to business and interactivity 
between business and government has never been realized. 
 
 1. Keith W. Holman, The Regulatory Flexibility Act at 25: Is the Law Achieving Its 
Goal?, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1119, 1119 (2006). 
 2. Sarah E. Shive, If You’ve Always Done it That Way, It’s Probably Wrong: How the 
Regulatory Flexibility Act Has Failed to Change Agency Behavior, and How Congress Can 
Fix It, 1 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 153, 157-58 (2006). 
 3. Holman, supra note 1, at 1119-20. 
 4. Nicole V. Crain & W. Mark Crain, The Impact of Regulatory Costs on Small Firms,  
(U.S. Small Bus. Admin., Office of Advocacy, Washington, D.C.), 2010, at iv. 
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At the same time, public criticism of agency effectiveness in general 
has become severe.  In the summer of 2010, in the wake of the British 
Petroleum (BP) oil spill, national attention focused on the manifest failures 
of some of the largest regulatory agencies.  The leadership of the Minerals 
Management Service, after years of criticism, was finally replaced.  
President Obama told the country that the new agency chief‘s main task 
would be to ―build an organization that acts as the oil industry‘s watchdog, 
not its partner.‖
5
  New agencies like the Consumer Finance Protection 
Bureau were created to regulate matters affecting the interests of 
consumers and financial institutions.  Furthermore, the President has 
mandated that agencies increase transparency and participation in their 
rulemaking processes by using the internet.
6
  Federal agencies were 
required to create ―open government plans‖ with several specific elements 
to increase public information, engagement and collaboration.
7
  These 
government mandates represent valuable reinforcement for the goals of the 
RFA, although they have not been widely recognized as such.  By requiring 
agencies to make their rulemaking more transparent and increasing 
opportunities for feedback during the process, these initiatives have 
increased the ability of small businesses to convey their concerns to 
regulators and engage in a productive dialogue before unnecessarily 
burdensome regulations go on the books. 
A new approach to the underlying goals of the RFA, one that 
empowers small businesses, taps the potential creativity of regulators and 
streamlines the interactivity between government and its citizens, could 
have a much greater impact.  Given the small chance of a mutually 
satisfactory resolution between small business owners and regulators who 
follow the letter of the RFA, this article eschews a primary focus on the 
standard account.  Instead, the purpose of this article is to encourage 
interactive regulation from both the businessperson‘s and regulator‘s 
perspectives.  We recommend strategies for business people to more 
effectively interact with government agencies.  We also recommend 
strategies for regulators to make their processes more open and receptive to 
input. 
The goal for small businesses is not the prevention of all future 
regulation that could possibly affect their business, but instead to establish 
 
 5. Press Release, President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President to the Nation on 
the BP Oil Spill (June 15, 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/remarks-president-nation-bp-oil-spill. 
 6. Memorandum from President Barack Obama to the Heads of Exec. Dep‘ts and 
Agencies on Transparency and Open Government (Jan. 21, 2009), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/transparencyandopengovernment/. 
 7. Memorandum from Peter R. Orszag, Dir., Office of Mgmt. & Budget, to the Heads 
of Executive Dep‘ts & Agencies, Open Government Directive, at 4 (Dec. 8, 2009), available 
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/assets/memoranda_2010/m10-06.pdf. 
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a collaborative effort with government that maximizes the goals of federal 
mandates while minimizing the costs imposed on operations.  This change 
not only requires a different approach, but a more interactive perspective 
toward regulation and the RFA.  The purpose of this paper is to make this 
new interactive approach a reality. 
Part II of this article examines the history, development, and current 
treatment of the RFA.  This Part will show that although the RFA has been 
subject to significant criticism, it still has the potential to improve the 
efficiency and effectiveness of agencies, and, in particular, their regulation 
of small businesses.  Part III of this article turns its attention to the 
perceptions and actions of small businesses.  This Part reveals that small 
business leaders carry with them strongly negative attitudes about 
regulation and government that impair their ability to act effectively on 
behalf of their organizations.  In addition, this Part shows that regulators 
are not simply passive mirrors of their agency goals, but are dynamic and 
reactive to the environment around them. 
Part IV presents strategies for small enterprise owners to more 
effectively interact with regulators through a variety of means.  As we 
explain in Part IV, providing regulators with more detailed, accurate and 
current information about the specific challenges small enterprises face 
should help regulators work more efficiently to balance the needs of small 
enterprises with broader social, commercial and environmental goals. 
Part V presents strategies for federal agencies to improve their 
responsiveness to small businesses by opening new portals for 
communication.  In this section, we suggest lessons that federal agencies 
can learn from state-level innovations and recommend other strategies as 
well.  This article concludes that interaction with government that is based 
on a development of mutual trust and commitment toward resolution, 
although less viscerally satisfying than traditional approaches, can over the 
long-term produce a more favorable competitive environment for 
businesses and more flexible opportunities for regulators to satisfy 
legislative commands. 
II.  THE PURPOSE, FUNCTION, AND LIMITATIONS OF THE RFA 
A.  The History and Substance of the RFA 
During the 1970s, Congress became increasingly concerned with the 
growing burden that federal regulation imposed on small businesses.
8
  In a 
series of hearings, Congress learned that small businesses were being 
 
 8. Barry A. Pineles, The Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act: New 
Options in Regulatory Relief, 5 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 29, 30 (1997). 
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grossly underrepresented in regulatory proceedings and that single-solution 
regulation, applied uniformly to all businesses, disproportionately burdened 
small companies.
9
  Frustrated small business representatives attended a 
1980 conference on small business hosted by the White House.
10
  Many 
business attendees expressed frustration over the growing regulatory 
burdens and paperwork demands that federal regulations required.
11
 
Congress responded by passing the RFA.  Enacted with relatively little 
fanfare in 1980,
12
 President Carter stated that the new regulation would 
―give[] Americans their money‘s worth.‖
13




In short, the RFA requires federal agencies to consider the impact of 
their regulatory proposals on small businesses before imposing new rules.  
This requires that an initial regulatory flexibility analysis (IRFA) be 
published in the Federal Register at the time a new rule is proposed.
15
  The 
IRFA must include the rationale behind the proposed rule, its goals, the 
type and number of affected entities, a description of compliance 
requirements, and the need for any professional skills required to comply 
with the rule.
16
  The IRFA must also identify any existing rules that might 
conflict or overlap with the proposed rule, and must contain alternative 
options that would achieve the agency‘s objections in a less burdensome 
fashion.
17
  Later in the rulemaking process, agencies must also prepare a 
final regulatory flexibility analysis (FRFA), which discloses the rule‘s 
rationale and objectives, a summary of issues raised during the public 
comment period, an evaluation of those issues, a list of any changes made 




The RFA leaves an escape clause, however, for agencies to avoid this 
entire process.  The head of an agency may simply certify that the rule will 
not impose a ―significant economic impact on a substantial number of 
 
 9. Id.  For a detailed review of Congressional hearings preceding the passage of the 
RFA, see Paul R. Verkuil, A Critical Guide to the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 1982 DUKE 
L.J. 213 (1982). 
 10. Pineles, supra note 8, at 30. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Verkuil, supra note 9, at 214. 
 13. Id. at 215 (quoting THE WHITE HOUSE, REGULATORY REFORM: PRESIDENT CARTER‘S 
PROGRAM 2 (1980)). 
 14. Id. at 252. 
 15. 5 U.S.C. § 603(a) (2006). 
 16. Id. at § 603(b). 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. at § 604(a).  The RFA also imposes a periodic review requirement of all rules, 
requiring federal agencies to review all of their existing regulations over a period of ten 
years, eliminating those which are duplicative, unduly burdensome, or unnecessary.             
5 U.S.C. § 610 (2006). 
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small entities‖ if promulgated.
19
  If that occurs, then the agency simply has 
to publish the certification and need not undergo further regulatory 
analysis.
20
  While some agencies have developed definitions for the terms 
‗significant impact‘ and ‗substantial number‘ on their own, other agencies 
have left interpretation of the statute up to the discretion of individual 
members in the agency.
21
  As a result, this initial determination of whether 
a proposed regulation will affect small businesses, made mainly within the 
discretion of the agency, determines whether the rigorous RFA analyses are 
implemented fully or circumvented altogether. 
The potential for abuse of this discretionary opt-out provision was 
only one of the RFA‘s weaknesses.  Another was the difficulties that small 
businesses faced in redressing agency noncompliance with the RFA.  
Certainly, concern for small businesses was always at the heart of the 
RFA.
22
  Even in its original form, the RFA recognized the need for more 
nuanced treatment of these businesses, acknowledging that ―unnecessary 
regulations create entry barriers in many industries and discourage potential 
entrepreneurs from introducing beneficial products and processes.‖
23
  In its 
early years, however, small businesses had no way to protect their interests 
when agencies failed to follow the RFA‘s requirements. 
In 1996, the RFA was amended by the Small Business Regulatory 
Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA).
24
  Until that amendment, small 
business owners who felt that new or proposed regulations had been 
promulgated in violation of the RFA had no legal recourse.  In response to 
pressure from the small business community, which felt that many agencies 
were not complying with the terms of the RFA, the SBREFA strengthened 
the RFA by providing for a judicial review process.
25
  The SBREFA‘s 
judicial review provisions allow small businesses to file a complaint 
regarding a potential violation of the RFA up to a year after the agency has 
published the rule.
26
  If a court finds that the agency has not complied with 
the RFA, it may remand the rule to the agency and delay enforcement of 
the rule until the agency has analyzed the rule, as required.
27
  The SBREFA 
also tightened the factual requirements for agency certifications by 
 
 19. Id. at § 605(b). 
 20. Id. 
 21. Shive, supra note 2, at 158. 
 22. Holman, supra note 1, at 1119; Michael R. See, Willful Blindness: Federal 
Agencies’ Failure to Comply with the Regulatory Flexibility Act’s Periodic Review 
Requirement—And Current Proposals to Invigorate the Act, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1199, 
1201 (2006). 
 23. 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2006) (Congressional Findings and Declaration of Purpose). 
 24. Pub. L. No. 104-121, 110 Stat. 847 (1996). 
 25. 5 U.S.C. § 611(a) (2006). 
 26. Id. at § 611(a)(3)(A). 
 27. Id. at § 611(a)(4). 
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requiring that agencies articulate a specific factual basis that supports the 
agency‘s statement of certification.
28
  Finally, the SBREFA required the 
Environmental Protection Agency and the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration convene small business advocacy review panels to consult 
with small businesses on regulations expected to have a significant impact 
on them before the regulations are published for comment.
29
 
In August 2002, the RFA was further strengthened when President 
Bush signed Executive Order 13,272.
30
  That order mandated all federal 
agencies to develop written policies describing how they measured the 
impact of proposed legislation on small businesses.
31
  It also gave further 
definition to the process by which agencies were to work with the Small 
Business Administration (SBA) Office of Advocacy to develop alternatives 
to legislation that would significantly affect a substantial number of small 
businesses, and required the SBA to develop training for the agencies on 
how to comply with the RFA.
32
 
Subsequent efforts to improve the RFA have failed.  In 2007, the 
House Small Business Committee unanimously approved a bill to add new 
requirements to the RFA.
33
  If passed, the bill would have required agencies 
to consider the indirect impacts of their proposed legislation on small 
businesses as well as the direct impacts as the RFA already mandated.
34
  
The bill would also have required federal agencies to conduct a periodic 
review of all of their regulations to determine whether any of them should 
be modified or eliminated.
35
  However, the bill never reached the House or 
Senate for review. 
Although the RFA has not evolved significantly for several years, 
many states have enacted their own versions of the RFA.  Some states have 
adopted versions of a model ―mini-RFA‖ that the SBA has developed.  In 
May 2009, for example, Connecticut amended the state‘s regulatory 
processes to help ensure that new rules and regulations do not 
unnecessarily burden small businesses.
36
  These state laws share the RFA‘s 
goal of increasing agency appreciation for entrepreneurs and small business 
owners and encouraging interaction between agencies and small 
 
 28. Id. at § 605(b). 
 29. Id. at § 609(b), (d). 
 30. Exec. Order No. 13,272, 67 Fed. Reg. 159, (August 13, 2002). 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. H.R. 4458, 110th Cong. (2007). 
 34. Id. at § 3. 
 35. Id. at § 5; General Policy: House Small Business Committee Endorses More 
Federal Review of Regulatory Burdens, NAT‘L ENVTL. DAILY, Dec. 14, 2007. 
 36. Connecticut Is Latest New England State To Strengthen Regulatory Flexibility for 
Small Business, SMALL BUS. ADVOCATE (U.S. Small Bus. Admin., Office of Advocacy, 
Washington, D.C.), May 1, 2009, at 8. 
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businesses.  Other state laws, however, try to achieve this general goal 
through a number of different means.  In some instances, innovations on 
the state level have succeeded where the RFA arguably has not.  Part V 
below discusses some effective state versions in more detail and explores 
ways in which these variations might serve as a model for further reform of 
the RFA. 
B.  Perceived Weaknesses in the Statutory Language 
Both government and academic commentators have acknowledged the 
numerous weaknesses in the statutory language of the RFA.  Most 
prominently, critics have noted that a number of vague terms in the RFA 
impede clear and consistent application across agencies.  As noted earlier, 
the RFA requires agencies to consider alternatives when they determine 
that a proposed regulation will have a ―significant economic impact on a 
substantial number of small entities.‖
37
  Scholars analyzing the RFA‘s 
effectiveness have pointed out the relative vagueness of the terms 
―significant‖ and ―substantial number.‖  As one author notes, without 
further clarification, these terms are ―completely discretionary.‖
38
 
Another author expressed concern over the meaning of the words 
―small entities.‖  The RFA defines the term as having the same meaning as 
―‗small business concern‘ under section 3 of the Small Business Act.‖
39
  
The Small Business Act, in turn, defines a small business concern as one 
that is ―independently owned and operated and which is not dominant in its 
field of operation.‖
40
  Further size standards can be established
41
 and 
agencies typically use elaborate SBA standards tailored to particular 
industries.
42
  The result has been unusual classifications for small 
businesses.  For example, the SBA defines small entities for cable and pay 
television as firms generating $11 million or less in revenue annually.
43
  At 
one point, this definition resulted in 1423 of the 1758 cable and pay 
television firms in existence to fall under the ambit of small entity 
protection.
44
  This led one author to call the ―small entity‖ definition 
 
 37. 5 U.S.C. § 609(a) (2006). 
 38. Shive, supra note 2, at 167; See, supra note 22, at 1223-24. 
 39. 5 U.S.C. § 601(3) (2006).  The section uses the term ―small business,‖ but also 
states that the term ―small entity‖ should be given the same meaning.  Id. at § 601(6).  Small 
entity is defined in 5 U.S.C. § 601(6) as including ―small business‖ too.  Id. 
 40. 15 U.S.C. 632(a)(1) (2006). 
 41. Id. at § 632(a)(2)(A). 
 42. Michelle Goldberg-Cahn, Note, Associated Fisheries of Maine, Inc. v. Daley: A 
Balanced Approach to Judicial Review Under the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 51 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 663, 670 (1999). 
 43. Id. at 671 n.45 (citing 13 C.F.R. § 121.201 (1998)). 
 44. Id. 
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―tenuous‖ and to conclude that, ―[s]urprisingly, a small entity may include 
a national organization generating millions of dollars
 
and employing 
thousands of workers .
 
. . . Thus, the group that the RFA attempts to 
protect, small entities, has many definitions, the meanings of which vastly 
differ among industries and people.‖
45
 
Another troublingly vague provision is the RFA‘s requirement, under 
Section 610, that agencies review their own regulations every ten years.  
Scholars have noted that different agencies interpret this requirement 
differently.
46
  Some agencies, including the Department of Transportation, 
interpret Section 610‘s terms to mean that they must review all of their 
regulations every ten years.
47
  Other agencies, including the Environmental 
Protection Agency, understand Section 610 to require them only to review 
those regulations that the agency believed would have a ―significant impact 




Then there is the question of when that ten-year clock starts to run.  
Michael See has noted that some agencies take the view that amending a 
rule ―‗restarts the clock,‘ allowing the agency another ten years for RFA 
review from the date of amendment‖ rather than the date that the initial rule 
was adopted.
49
  For example, See notes that with regard to a 1993 
Department of Commerce regulation limiting the pollock fishing season 
that was amended in 1996, the Department of Commerce would likely 
argue that it had ten years from the date of the amendment to review the 
rule, rather than ten years from the date of the original regulation‘s 
enactment in 1993.
50
  The variability among agency interpretations of 
Section 610‘s requirements further reduces the RFA‘s effectiveness overall. 
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has echoed the 
concerns of scholars like Shive and See, repeatedly calling for reforms of 
the RFA because its terms are so vague.  In 1994, the GAO noted that the 
terms of the RFA lend themselves to an impossibly wide range of 
interpretations, leading to widely divergent results.
51
  In 2002 and 2006, the 
GAO issued additional critiques of the RFA on several of the same grounds 
as its 1994 report.
52
  In each of these reports, the GAO urged Congress to 
 
 45. Id. at 670–71. 
 46. 5 U.S.C. § 610(a) (2006); Shive, supra note 2, at 163. 
 47. Shive, supra note 2, at 163. 
 48. Id. 
 49. See, supra note 22, at 1220. 
 50. Id. at 1221. 
 51. U.S. GOV‘T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-94-105, REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY 
ACT: STATUS OF AGENCIES‘ COMPLIANCE (1994). 
 52. U.S. GOV‘T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-998T, REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY 
ACT: CONGRESS SHOULD REVISIT AND CLARIFY ELEMENTS OF THE ACT TO IMPROVE ITS 
EFFECTIVENESS (2006); U.S. GOV‘T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-02-491T, REGULATORY 
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provide the SBA with the authority to interpret the RFA‘s requirements, 
reasoning that a uniform interpretation would lend more consistency to 
agency understanding and implementation of the RFA‘s terms. 
Another recognized weakness of the RFA is its failure to reach 
regulations that indirectly affect small businesses, even though their 
eventual impact may be greater than direct regulation.
53
  For example, the 
EPA‘s certification of ozone emission standards, which states regulate, has 
been held to be exempt from the RFA‘s provisions because the standards 
do not directly affect small businesses.
54
  There was little debate that the 
certification affected small businesses; the SBA, in fact, had advised the 
EPA that the standards would substantially burden those businesses.
55
  
Because the SBA served only as an advisory agency to the EPA on this 
issue, however, the court refused to consider the SBA‘s determination in 
evaluating the effect of the EPA regulations on small businesses.
56
  Indeed, 
recent case law confirms that courts generally will not consider RFA-based 
challenges to a regulation brought by small businesses that are only 
indirectly affected by that regulation.
57
 
Both scholars and government officials have called attention to this 
failure.
58
  In 2006, Keith Holman, then the Assistant Chief Counsel in the 
SBA‘s Office of Advocacy, noted that the RFA could be strengthened in 
part by broadening the scope of the RFA to address both the direct and 
indirect impacts of proposed regulation on small businesses.
59
  As noted 
above, this issue was addressed in the ―Small Business Regulatory 
Improvement Act‖ (HR 4458), introduced in December 2007, but the bill 
did not reach either the House or the Senate for a vote.
60
 
Critics have also noted that the RFA does little to address the 
 
FLEXIBILITY ACT: CLARIFICATION OF KEY TERMS STILL NEEDED (2002). 
 53. Eric Phelps, The Cunning of Clever Bureaucrats: Why the Small Business 
Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act Isn’t Working, 31 PUB. CONT. L.J. 123, 136–37 
(2001). 
 54. Am. Trucking Ass‘n Inc. v. USEPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1045 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
 55. Id. at 1044. 
 56. Id. 
 57. White Eagle Coop. Ass‘n v. Conner, 553 F.3d 467, 480 (7th Cir. 2009).  The 
rationale of this decision borrows explicitly from a long line of similar holdings in the 
District of Columbia. See, e.g., Cement Kiln Recycling Coal. v. EPA, 255 F.3d 855, 868–69 
(D.C. Cir. 2001) (holding that RFA did not require EPA to certify that there would be no 
substantial effect on small business generators of hazardous waste); Mid-Tex Elec. Coop. v. 
FERC, 773 F.2d 327 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (holding FERC reasonably adopted a rule for valid 
purposes). 
 58. Holman, supra note 1, at 1132. 
 59. Id. 
 60. CURTIS W. COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34355, THE REGULATORY 
FLEXIBILITY ACT: IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES AND PROPOSED REFORM 7, n.18 (2008), 
http://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/bitstreams/19430.pdf; see also 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h110-4458. 
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cumulative impact of regulations that affect small businesses—the 
problem, as Keith Holman called it, of ―death by a thousand cuts.‖
61
  Just as 
the RFA fails to address regulations that indirectly affect small businesses, 
it does little to address the cumulative effect of regulations that may not 
have a ―significant economic impact on a substantial number of small 
entities‖ individually, but which significantly affect those businesses over 
time and in conjunction with other regulations.  To help address this 
problem, Holman has recommended that Congress codify Executive Order 
13272, which requires agencies to analyze the cumulative and foreseeable 
indirect effects of their regulations on small businesses.
62
 
While many scholarly analyses and government reports have focused 
on the RFA‘s flaws, few have discussed the RFA‘s limitations in light of 
the unique challenges small businesses face.  By focusing on the goals of 
assisting small businesses, which was certainly a primary goal of the RFA, 
scholars have tended to overlook the ways in which the regulators 
themselves might benefit from a closer and more nuanced interaction with 
their smaller targets. 
C.  Perceived Weaknesses in the Application of the Statutory Language 
Because agencies have great latitude to interpret the language of the 
RFA as they see fit, different agencies can come to entirely different 
conclusions about their meaning.  That, in turn, can lead to disparity and 
inconsistency in their application from agency to agency, and perhaps even 
from year to year.  Some interpretations may appear to be more self-serving 
than sensible.  Shive observed that in 1999, for example, the EPA 
determined that one of its regulations would impose costs of $7,500 the 
first year and $5,000 the next year on over 5,000 small businesses, and 
require each of them to prepare a report that would take them 
approximately 100 hours to complete.  According to the EPA, this 
regulation did not have a ―significant impact on a substantial number of 
small businesses‖—a determination that the EPA has made for ninety-six 
of the regulations it has passed since 1996.
63
 
Just as agencies‘ interpretations of key RFA terms vary, agencies vary 
greatly in their compliance with the RFA overall.  A 1994 GAO report 
found that the EPA and SEC were among the agencies exhibiting the most 
comprehensive compliance with the RFA, while the IRS was among the 
least compliant.
64
  The GAO offered variations on the same criticism in 
 
 61. Holman, supra note 1, at 1134. 
 62. Id. at 1135–36. 
 63. Shive, supra note 2, at 161. 
 64. U.S. GOV‘T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 51, at 4, 7-8. 
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their 2002 and 2006 RFA critiques as well.
65
  To what extent this variable 
compliance is due to the agencies‘ differing interpretation of the RFA‘s 
requirements, as opposed to other possible explanations such as the 
agencies‘ failure to meet their statutory obligations as they understand 
them, is not clear. 
Agency compliance does appear to be improving, however.  One 
review of the RFA on its twenty-fifth anniversary, written by a member of 
the SBA‘s Office of Advocacy, noted increasing agency compliance with 
the RFA, and praised the RFA process for its effectiveness in enabling 




Scholars have also suggested that agencies exercise this latitude under 
the RFA to simply avoid the kind of burden analysis that the RFA was 
meant to compel.  As noted above, agencies considering a new regulation 
are only required to conduct a regulatory flexibility analysis if they have 
determined that the proposed regulation may have a significant economic 
impact on a substantial number of small businesses.  If the agency 
determines that the proposed rule will not have such an impact, it can issue 
a certification to that effect and forgo the analysis that would otherwise be 
required.
67
  Because agencies can make that burden-reducing determination 
unilaterally, scholars have noted, the RFA leaves too much room for abuse 
of agency discretion.
68
  One Department of Labor employee seemed to 
confirm this suspicion when he explained that ―[w]e routinely certified 
[that] proposed rules would have no significant impact on a substantial 
number of small entities without a second thought.  We didn‘t even bother 
to decide internally what constituted a ‗small entity,‘ or what ‗significant‘ 
meant either.‖
69
  Similarly, Keith Holman has noted that agencies can 
circumvent the terms of the RFA by issuing guidance documents and 
enforcement initiative consent agreements, neither of which employ the 
notice and comment procedures that the RFA addresses.
70
 
Other critics, including Eric Phelps, have expressed concern that 
agencies have little incentive to comply with several RFA requirements 
because there is little judicial review to hold them accountable for not 
doing so.
71
  For example, as noted above, the RFA requires agencies to 
conduct an initial regulatory flexibility analysis (IRFA) and consider 
 
 65. U.S. GOV‘T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 52, at 4-6. 
 66. Holman, supra note 1, at 1129–32. 
 67. 5 U.S.C § 605(b) (2006). 
 68. Phelps, supra note 53, at 134–35. 
 69. John Shanahan, Regulating the Regulators: Regulatory Process Reform in the 104th 
Congress, REGULATION, Winter 1997, available at 
http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regv20n1/reg20n1b.html. 
 70. Holman, supra note 1, at 1133–34. 
 71. Phelps, supra note 53, at 133–39. 
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whether any less burdensome alternatives are available.
72
  In Allied Local & 
Reg’l Mfrs. Caucus v. U.S. EPA,
73
 where the EPA was accused of failing to 
comply with this requirement, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia ruled that it had no jurisdiction to decide the issue.
74
  The only 
RFA provisions subject to judicial review, according to the court, are the 
subset of the RFA‘s provisions listed in the ―Judicial Review‖ provision at 
5 U.S.C. § 611.
75
  As a result of this lack of jurisdiction to evaluate IRFA 
compliance and the lack of judicial power to convene review panels, small 
businesses cannot participate in this important early stage of the agency‘s 
rulemaking process.
76
  They also cannot ensure that the SBREFA 
objectives are carried out by the agency.
77
 
What little judicial interpretation of the RFA there has been has set a 
low bar for agency compliance, and courts have generally adopted a ―hands 
off‖ policy toward the RFA.  The RFA has been interpreted as a purely 
procedural requirement, imposing no substantive constraint on agency 
decision-making.
78
  Courts will not interfere with an agency‘s own 
judgment of how to comply with the RFA‘s requirements, or whether it is 
exempt from doing so, unless there is a flagrant abuse of the agency‘s 
discretion.  Courts have also taken a fairly narrow view of who has 
standing to challenge an agency‘s compliance with the RFA in the first 
place.  At least one court has limited the right to sue an agency for failing 
to comply with the RFA‘s initial regulatory flexibility analysis requirement 
to small businesses that would be affected by the final agency action.
79
 
III.  THE LEGAL AND REGULATORY CHALLENGES OF ENTREPRENEURIAL 
AND SMALL BUSINESS ACTIVITY 
Understanding the unique characteristics of entrepreneurs and small 
businesses is a critical first step toward developing a more productive 
relationship with administrative agencies that administer the RFA.  
Acknowledging these strengths and weaknesses, and paying special 
attention to how they differ from larger firms with which legislators and 
regulators may be more familiar, informs the discussion in two ways.  First 
and most importantly, it allows commentators to bridge the gap between 
theory and practice in developing workable solutions for entrepreneurs and 
 
 72. See supra notes 17–24 and accompanying text. 
 73. 215 F.3d 61 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
 74. Id. at 80. 
 75. Id. at 79. 
 76. Phelps, supra note 53, at 134. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Nat‘l Tel. Coop. Ass‘n v. F.C.C., 563 F.3d 536, 540 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
 79. Williams Alaska Petrol. v. United States, 57 Fed. Cl. 789, 801 (2003). 
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small firms.  In addition, understanding the needs of this constituency helps 
legislators and regulators meet those needs most effectively. 
Entrepreneurs are faced with unique and difficult challenges.  They 
need to acquire capital from investors or loans from banks.  They must also 
focus on making their vision for their product or service a reality.  
Entrepreneurs also have a brand to develop.  Growing brand equity can be 
a costly process, especially when larger competitors have already 
established brands that are well entrenched in the minds of consumers.  
Furthermore, so many vehicles for advertising exist that it is difficult for 
the entrepreneur to break through the chatter and reach potential customers.  
Entrepreneurs lack the dedicated staff to focus on specific functional areas.  
The entrepreneur must be financier, personnel manager, accountant, 
technologist, and marketer for the company‘s operations.  The need for an 
entrepreneur to manage such divergent disciplines inevitably implies that 
each functional area will not receive its due attention relative to larger 
businesses.  It also means that each functional area will not benefit from the 
level of expertise that a dedicated practitioner in the field can bring.  The 
entrepreneur must too often be all things to all people, and as the proverb 
goes, the jack-of-all-trades is sometimes the master of none. 
A.  The Unique Perception of Small Business toward Risk-Taking and 
Political Activity 
While it is not entirely clear from available research, small businesses 
appear to represent a large portion of the U.S. economy.
80
  Yet, it appears to 
 
 80. Prevailing statistics claim that the economic influence that small businesses assert is 
almost overwhelming.  According to the SBA, small businesses represent 99.7% of all 
employer firms, employ just over half of all private sector employees, pay forty-four percent 
of the total U.S. private payroll, generate sixty-four percent of new jobs (over the past 
fifteen years), produce thirteen times more patents than large patenting firms, and generate 
more than half of the non-farm private gross domestic product.  How important are small 
businesses to the U.S. economy?, SBA, OFFICE OF ADVOCACY, available at 
http://www.sba.gov/advocacy/7495/8420 (last visited Jan. 27, 2011).  The 99.7% figure 
alone has been cited repeatedly in the academic literature in a variety of contexts.  See, e.g., 
David A. Domina, The Debilitating Effects of Concentration Markets Affecting Agriculture, 
15 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 61, 77 (2010) (discussing the economic risks of concentration of 
power in too few food producers); David Lourie, Note, Rethinking Donor Disclosure After 
the Proposition 8 Campaign, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 133, 165 (2009) (arguing that disclosing the 
name of a donor‘s employer presents privacy concerns for donors employed by small 
businesses); Dexter K. Case & Jennifer R. Alderfer, BAPCPA and the New Provisions 
Relating to Small Businesses, 15 WIDENER L.J. 585, 585 (2006) (discussing reorganization 
options of small businesses under BAPCPA); Steven H. Hobbs & Fay Wilson Hobbs, 
Family Business and the Business of Families: A Consideration of the Role of the Lawyer, 4 
TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 153, 156 (1998) (discussing the uniqueness of family owned small 
businesses, as relates to law services).  The statistics are also cited in research specifically 
discussing the RFA.  See, e.g., Holman, supra note 1, at 1120–21.  Yet these statistics are 
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be the study of the individual entrepreneur that generates greater scholarly 
inquiry in business research.
81
  Although entrepreneurs and small business 
owners are not identical in nature,
82
 there is considerable overlap between 
the two.
83
  The important distinction for purposes of this paper is between 
businesses that are able to benefit from the reviews required by the RFA 
and other supportive measures described here, and those that are not. 
As seen through the management literature studying entrepreneurs and 
small business owners, such individuals have a unique perspective on risk, 
market-assessment, and their own business abilities.
84
  One study of 
entrepreneurs found that entrepreneurs are more likely to exhibit 
overconfidence than their large-manager counterparts.
85
  The study also 
found greater representativeness in entrepreneurs, defined by the 
willingness to generalize about a person or phenomenon based upon on a 
few attributes or observations.
86
  Other studies have found differences in 
the entrepreneur‘s need for achievement and tolerance of ambiguity when 




sharply criticized by David Hirschberg, a statistician and economist who has worked for the 
SBA, as not credible and devised to pursue political ends such as stopping health care 
reform.  David Hirschberg, The Job-Generation Issue and Its Impact on Health Insurance 
Policy, 44 CHALLENGE 82 (2001). 
 81. James W. Carland et al., Differentiating Entrepreneurs from Small Business 
Owners: A Conceptualization, 9 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 354, 355 (1984) (stating that 
―[a]lthough small business is a significant segment of the American economy, the 
entrepreneurial portion of that segment may wield a disproportionate influence.  If 
entrepreneurship can be viewed as incorporating innovation and growth, the most fertile 
ground for management research may be entrepreneurs and entrepreneurial ventures.‖). 
 82. Wayne H. Stewart, Jr., et al., A Proclivity for Entrepreneurship: A Comparison of 
Entrepreneurs, Small Business Owners, and Corporate Managers, 14 J. BUS. VENTURING 
189, 204 (1998) (finding that ―[s]mall business owners are less risk oriented and are not as 
highly motivated to achieve as are entrepreneurs.  Small business owners also lack the same 
degree of preference for innovation.‖). 
 83. Carland et al., supra note 81, at 357.  See also Stewart et al., supra note 82, at 191 
(stating that ―[a]ccording to the authors, an entrepreneur capitalizes on innovative 
combinations of resources for the principal purposes of profit and growth, and uses strategic 
management practices. Alternatively, the small business owner operates a business as an 
extension of the individual‘s personality to further personal goals and to produce family 
income.‖). 
 84. Mark Simon, Susan M. Houghton & Karl Aquino, Cognitive Biases, Risk 
Perception and Venture Formation: How Individuals Decide to Start Companies, 15 J. BUS. 
VENTURING 113 (2000); Robert A. Baron, Cognitive Mechanisms in Entrepreneurship: Why 
and When Entrepreneurs Think Differently than Other People, 13 J. BUS. VENTURING 275 
(1998). 
 85. Lowell W. Busenitz & Jay B. Barney, Differences between Entrepreneurs and 
Managers in Large Organizations: Biases and Heuristics in Strategic Decision-Making, 12 
J. BUS. VENTURING 9, 22–23 (1997). 
 86. Id. at 16, 22–23. 
 87. See, e.g., Thomas M. Begley & David P. Boyd, Psychological Characteristics 
Associated with Performance in Entrepreneurial Firms and Smaller Businesses, 2 J. BUS. 
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A particularly important characteristic of entrepreneurs and small 
business owners that might influence their interaction with the RFA is their 
attitude towards risk.  There are numerous dimensions of risk in business 
activities beyond the political or regulatory risk that is the focus of most 
legal scholarship.  Financial risk can arise from non-payment by a major 
customer or the change in the cost of capital.  Changes in unemployment 
and national economic strength underlie economic risk.  Operational risk 
constantly lurks in the breakdown or theft of key manufacturing equipment. 
Both academic research and common sense dictate that entrepreneurs 
perceive risk differently.  The most obvious conclusion is that 
entrepreneurs accept higher levels of risk in both their business decisions 
and their careers generally because of the inherently precarious nature of 
entrepreneurial activity.  Between fifty and seventy-five percent of small 
businesses fail within the first five years.
88
  More than eighty percent of the 
businesses that survive the first five years will fail in the subsequent five 
years.
89
  As the risks of new ventures are widely known, the implication for 
entrepreneurs is that they have a higher propensity for taking risks.  
Whereas a manager of a large company would perceive significant risk and 
avoid the activity, the entrepreneur might pursue the venture in spite of the 
uncertainty. 
Such a conclusion may seem intuitive.  However, predicted 
differences in risk propensity for entrepreneurs have not been reproduced 
in academic data.  As one author recently writes, ―[r]esearch has fairly 
consistently shown that entrepreneurs do not differ significantly from other 
members of the population in terms of their propensity to take risks.‖
90
  
This conclusion does not necessarily mean that small business owners are 
risk neutral.  It also does not mean that academic research on this topic 
defies common sense.  Instead, it may require a closer examination of the 
concept of risk and an understanding that reconciles both with the academic 
data and our understanding of entrepreneurial behavior. 
Instead of perceiving risk and taking on risky activity, entrepreneurs 
 
VENTURING 79 (1987) (examining the prevalence of five psychological traits in a sample of 
entrepreneurs); John B. Miner, Norman R. Smith & Jeffrey S. Bracker, Role of 
Entrepreneurial Task Motivation in the Growth of Technologically Innovative Firms, 74 J. 
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 554, 557–58 (1989) (discussing a task motivation study). 
 88. John W. Lee, A Populist Political Perspective of the Business Tax Entities 
Universe: “Hey the Stars Might Lie but the Numbers Never Do” 78 TEX. L. REV. 885, 925 
n.225 (2000) (noting five-year failure rate). 
 89. MICHAEL E. GERBER, THE E-MYTH REVISITED: WHY MOST SMALL BUSINESSES 
DON‘T WORK AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 2 (3d ed. 1995). 
 90. Laura C. Dunham, From Rational to Wise Action: Recasting Our Theories of 
Entrepreneurship, 92 J. BUS. ETHICS 513, 519 (2010) (citing Murray B. Low, & Ian C. 
MacMillan, Entrepreneurship: Past Research and Future Challenges, 14 J. MGMT. 139 
(1988)).  See also Busenitz & Barney, supra note 85, at 24 (stating that ―most academicians 
hold that entrepreneurs do not differ substantially in their risk-taking propensity‖). 
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may instead be subjected to various heuristics and biases that cause them to 
underestimate the risk of certain activity compared to managers of large 
firms.
91
  As noted earlier, entrepreneurs are more likely to exhibit 
overconfidence and representativeness when compared to their larger firm 
counterparts.
92
  Entrepreneurs may also view their situations more 
positively than circumstances warrant.
93
  Because entrepreneurs more 
readily generalize from limited experience, they may more likely reach the 
conclusion that a decision is less risky than is objectively warranted.  
Entrepreneurs are more susceptible to what one article called the ―illusion 
of control.‖
94
  This bias encourages a belief that a given situation can be 




A third intriguing possibility is that in some situations, risk is not 
simply overridden for the achievement of some greater objective.  Under 
this notion, the entrepreneur believes strongly in the normative goodness of 
the venture.
96
  The entrepreneur has a strong desire to solve an important 
problem, improve the common good, or achieve a personal goal.
97
  This 
practice does not simply devalue the presence of risk, but rather makes 
considerations of risk less important to the decision.
98
  Thus, the difference 
in risk propensity may not be the important difference in behavior, but 
rather the way that small businesses perceive and think about risk overall.
99
 
These varying perceptions of risk overall likely influence the 
perception of entrepreneurs toward legal, political, and regulatory risk, the 
types of risk most relevant to this article.  Entrepreneurs and small 
businesses typically will not have legal counsel on staff or playing a major 
role in daily operations.  Thus, legal advice from an inside or outside 
lawyer, which can provide important information about the level of legal 
risk, can be infrequent or non-existent.  Furthermore, while the 
entrepreneur or small business owner is likely trained in the business 
aspects of the operation and likely can function as a jack-of-all-trades, it is 
unlikely that these owners have received significant legal training as, with 
 
 91. Leslie E. Palich & D. Ray Bagby, Using Cognitive Theory to Explain 
Entrepreneurial Risk Taking: Challenging Conventional Wisdom, 10 J. BUS. VENTURING 
425, 434 (1995). 
 92. Busenitz & Barney, supra note 85, at 22–23. 
 93. Palich & Bagby, supra note 91, at 427. 
 94. Simon, Houghton & Aquino, supra note 84, at 118. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Dunham, supra note 90, at 519 (―Within the context of entrepreneurial start-up, 
normative considerations—e.g., a strong belief in the goodness of the venture‘s purpose . . . 
might make considerations of risk less important to the decision.‖). 
 97. See id. 
 98. See id. 
 99. Busenitz & Barney, supra note 85, at 25. 
BIRD & BROWNFINALIZED_ONE (DO NOT DELETE) 8/26/2011 10:51 AM 
854 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 13:4 
 
the exception of a single course in a business program, it remains a separate 
discipline with high entry and temporal costs.  Thus, managers and 
executives of small businesses are unlikely to have legal experience to 
weigh risks or to have resources available to assess that risk effectively. 
In addition, legal and regulatory risk is largely invisible.  A business‘s 
rivals are constantly present through their own strategies to capture market 
value.  A business‘s supply and other operational costs arise on a regular 
basis through receipt of invoices that must be paid.  Financial risk is a 
constant problem if the business has received a loan from the bank.  
Regular payments on debt must be made or the bank will take action 
against the business.  Customer demands and preferences continually 
challenge the business and it must maneuver to produce goods or services 
that the customer wants at a certain quality or price point.  The failure to do 
so will be immediately reflected in periodic receipts as customers look 
elsewhere to satisfy demand. 
The legal and regulatory environment does not exert a similarly 
constant pressure to act.  A business that complies with relevant legal rules 
is generally left alone.  Furthermore, a business that fails to comply with 
legal rules is not immediately met with sanction.  It is possible, perhaps 
tempting, for a business that is reducing costs through regulatory non-
compliance to continue that non-compliance indefinitely due to the 
perceived unlikelihood of government sanction.  This pressure may be 
especially significant for small businesses that perceive a competitive 
disadvantage compared to larger rivals and also lack sustained contact with 
legal counsel to warn of the dangers.  Risk-taking small business managers 
may find legal compliance a tempting place to cut corners or engage in 
technically legal though risky ‗on the borderline‘ behavior. 
The lack of pressured presence of the legal environment may not only 
encourage legally risky activity, it may also influence the manner and 
frequency in which small businesses participate in the political 
environment in which decisions about regulation are made.  Not only are 
the perspectives of small business managers different from their larger 
business counterparts, but their choices of participation mode and impact 
on the political environment are also different.  In the realm of corporate 
political activity, firm size remains a significant influence.
100
  For example, 
 
 100. See, e.g., Wendy L. Hansen & Neil J. Mitchell, Disaggregating and Explaining 
Corporate Political Activity: Domestic and Foreign Corporations in National Politics, 94 
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 891, 895 (2001) (discussing how corporations‘ donations to PACs and 
other charities can be seen as strategic behavior); David M. Hart, Why Do Some Firms 
Give? Why Do Some Firms Give a lot?: High-Tech PACs, 1977-1996, 63 J. POL. 1230, 
1236–37 (2001) (discussing the benefits to some firms from donations and lobbying over a 
twenty year period); Amy J. Hillman, Determinants of Political Strategies in US 
Multinationals, 42 BUS. & SOC‘Y 455, 472–73 (2003) (focusing on political strategies of US 
multinational corporations in Europe). 
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in one study, authors used questionnaires to determine whether the conduct 
of small companies differed from their larger brethren in how they engaged 
in corporate political activity.
101
  The study found that medium-sized 
companies reported a significantly better success rate in corporate political 
activities when compared to smaller companies.
102
 
This finding is not surprising, and supports the notion that firm size 
can act as a proxy for the resources available to engage in corporate 
political activity.  First, size can represent political power of the business.  
Larger businesses generate more benefits for various interest groups.  More 
workers are employed, more customers are served, and more suppliers 
generate business from selling goods and services to the larger businesses.  
Unintended beneficiaries, such as nearby restaurants and local businesses 
that receive the patronage of the large business‘s employees, also gain.  
Thus, the political power of the larger firms is not only more significant 
due to their size, but also due to the reliance of various stakeholders that 
benefit from their activities.  More stakeholders mean more voters that can 
influence the regulator or legislator to act.
103
  The result is an amplification 
effect that augments the larger firm‘s political power beyond the confines 
of its direct operations.  Small companies often lack the indirect or direct 
political influence to create this amplification effect. 
Second, firm size can also indicate the ability for more effective 
political engagement.
104
  A larger business may have specialists on staff 
that can monitor pending legislation and react in the most effective fashion 
possible.  A larger business may also have a dedicated lobbying firm on 
staff to advocate on its behalf.  These larger businesses may lead or 
dominate trade associations that serve to represent the interests of a number 
of businesses in an industry.  Small companies, on the other hand, lack the 
ability to have such dedicated resources ready.  Furthermore, their 
individual concerns might be devalued when competing with a larger and 
more politically savvy business that has competing interests in the 
regulatory environment. 
Third, firm size can indicate economic impact.  When a larger 
business suffers from the costs of increased regulation, its ability to provide 
jobs in the community and purchase goods from suppliers declines.  A firm 
that can claim that disagreeable regulations will impact the economic 
 
 101. Ronald G. Cook & Dale R. Fox, Resources, Frequency, and Methods: An Analysis 
of Small and Medium-Sized Firms’ Public Policy Activities, 39 BUS. & SOC‘Y 94, 98–100 
(2000). 
 102. Id. at 101. 
 103. Amy Hillman, Gerald D. Keim & Douglas Schuler, Corporate Political Activity: A 
Review and Research Agenda, 30 J. MGMT. 837, 839 (2004). 
 104. See, e.g., Douglas A. Schuler & Kathleen Rehbein, The Filtering Role of the Firm 
in Corporate Political Involvement, 36 BUS. & SOC‘Y 116 (1997). 
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environment of a locality in a significant way is likely to receive more 
attention of government representatives than a smaller firm that cannot 
claim such great harm.  This may be so even though the per capita injury 
may be greater to the smaller firm than the larger one.  Larger firms may 
also be more motivated not only to contest harmful regulation, but to argue 
proactively for a more favorable regulatory environment.  These firms may 




Interestingly, one would expect that, given the impediments to success 
that small companies face, they would be less active in the political 
environment.  Yet, Cook and Fox found that small companies were more 
active, not less, in corporate political activity than their medium-sized 
counterparts.
106
  Small companies also tackled a wider range of issues.
107
  In 
addition, small companies were more likely to participate in groups than 
medium-sized businesses.
108
  Intriguingly, even though small companies 
reported themselves to be more active, they also reported less successful 
outcomes when compared to the medium-sized businesses studied.
109
 
These findings can be combined to imply a pattern of corporate 
political activity for small businesses.  Reports of greater political activity 
for smaller firms are surprising, especially given the numerous costs and 
impediments to action in place.  However, it may be that the quantity of 
small business participation, rather than participation quality, is driving the 
results.  A hypothetical pattern may be the following:  small businesses, 
through a trade publication, local newsletter, or word-of-mouth, learn of 
regulation that is unfavorable.  Through their shared contacts or a formal 
network, these businesses contact their relevant government 
representatives.  The businesses are not highly sophisticated politically, nor 
are they coordinated, so scattered protests reach the regulator in a relatively 
disorganized fashion.
110
  Perhaps each small business writes about its own 
situation, giving only a micro-view of the impact of the questionable rule.  
Businesses might also focus on their own harm, resulting in arguments that 
vary in form, or even directly contradict their fellow small business owners 
seeking to change the rule.
111
  Legislators faced with pressure from various 
 
 105. Hillman, Keim & Schuler, supra note 103, at 839. 
 106. Cook & Fox, supra note 101, at 106-07. 
 107. Id. at 107. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. The study found that, with the exception of a negative effect of letter writing 
campaigns, there was no apparent ―‗silver bullet,‘ a method or combination of methods that 
was clearly a winner.‖  Id. at 108. 
 111. Ronald G. Cook & David Barry, Shaping the External Environment: A Study of 
Small Firms’ Attempts to Influence Public Policy, 34 BUS. & SOC‘Y 317, 319 (1995) 
[hereinafter Shaping the External Environment] (stating that ―[p]olicy makers accustomed to 
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groups or regulators tasked with a potentially aggressive mandate might 
discount the combined campaign because of its relative lack of unity and 
professionalism.  There may also be the presence of influence fatigue due 
to the repeated challenges of these smaller businesses.  The first campaign 
by small companies to reverse a rule might provoke attention.  The tenth 
campaign in a relatively short period of time, by contrast, might have a 
diluted effect on the targeted agency or legislator.  As a result, the more 
frequent and coordinated efforts by unsophisticated small businesses to 
engage in corporate political activity might produce less beneficial results 
than a more sophisticated larger business that understands how to lobby 
most efficiently and tactically for the greatest benefit.  The above scenario 
is merely a hypothetical, but may clarify at least in part the motivations for 
small firm activity and provide an explanation for the less productive 
results. 
B.  The Pressures of the Regulatory Environment 
This cross-disciplinary pressure inevitably influences how 
entrepreneurs interact with their regulatory environment.  At best, a 
business owner will give legal rules the same scattered treatment provided 
to business functions.  The entrepreneur might learn just enough about 
trademark law to develop an initial company logo.  The entrepreneur might 
follow the necessary steps to form a corporation, but neglect the corporate 
form once the business is underway.  If the entrepreneur interacts with 
regulators, the entrepreneur may only consider that interaction to the extent 
that regulators will leave the entrepreneur alone in the future.  The 
entrepreneur may never again choose to interact with government officials 
except when required to do so.  Given the constant pressures of running a 
business, dedicating time and effort to voluntary interaction with the 
regulatory environment is readily seen as an unwise use of limited 
resources. 
Yet small business owners face significant and persistent pressures 
from the regulatory environment.
112
  The most obvious pressure that small 
businesses face is the cost of complying with regulations.  Some variable 
costs might impose a similar percentage burden when compared to larger 
firms.  If a regulation requires a certain safety feature on a product, for 
 
dealing with the high-powered, smoothly orchestrated, and well-financed influence 
campaigns of large companies are likely to have difficulty making sense of and responding 
to the multi-faceted, loosely joined, and often-conflicted voices of small business owners.‖). 
 112. See Ronald G. Cook & David Barry, When Should the Small Firm be Involved in 
Public Policy?, 31 J. SMALL BUS. MGMT. 39, 39 (1993) [hereinafter When Should Firms be 
Involved] (stating that ―[i]n many industries, the political success of a business is no less 
important than marketplace success‖). 
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example, that feature is an added cost that increases or decreases according 
to the quantity of production. 
However, many regulatory costs are fixed costs that disproportionately 
burden small businesses.
113
  Firms handling a certain dangerous substance, 
for example, might be required to process, monitor, and store that 
substance in a similar fashion, regardless of the quantity of the substance 
used.  A large firm might benefit from economies of scale in providing 
facilities to store the substance that a small business cannot. 
Paperwork might also accompany regulatory compliance.  If 
paperwork requirements are the same regardless of a firm‘s size, then the 
cost of obtaining the information, keeping the necessary records and 
submitting those records to the appropriate agency may burden the small 
business more when compared to its larger competitor.  The economies of 
scale from paperwork requirements can be significant; an advantage which 
small businesses cannot easily exploit.
114
  Thus, the problem for small firms 
is both efficiency and effectiveness.  Small firms will not have the internal 
regulatory systems in place to process paperwork as efficiently as large 
ones.  Small firms will also not know enough about the regulatory 
environment to be as effective at compliance when compared to their larger 
brethren.  Furthermore, regulatory burdens in a small business can tax the 
resources of the very person whose attention is necessary elsewhere—the 
chief executive.
115
  Larger firms can delegate regulatory issues to 
specialists.  An entrepreneur may not have that luxury available, or it may 
come at a very high price.  Time spent managing regulatory problems is 
seen as time lost to developing one‘s product or service.  This zero-sum 
loss approach to regulation gives a strong incentive to avoid regulatory 
issues as much as possible. 
Small firms may also present more tempting targets because of their 
lack of resources.  If a small business is detected and prosecuted, it might 
be less likely to mount a successful defense against the prosecuting agency.  
Large businesses, by contrast, might be able to afford sophisticated and 
specialized legal counsel and dedicate significant funds to the defense. 
Entrepreneurs in particular might face special scrutiny.  Although 
many innovations represent reasonable extensions of current knowledge, 
some may be so unusual or radical that they might create a new category of 
product or service altogether.  A radically new phenomenon based upon 
entrepreneurial activity might not easily fall within an agency‘s regulatory 
scrutiny.  This might give the entrepreneur freedom for a time, but 
 
 113. Paul Sommers & Roland J. Cole, Costs of Compliance in Small and Medium-Sized 
Businesses, 6 AM. J. SMALL BUS. 25, 26 (1981). 
 114. WILLIAM A. BROCK & DAVID S. EVANS, THE ECONOMICS OF SMALL BUSINESS 136 
(1986). 
 115. Sommers & Cole, supra note 113, at 26. 
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regulatory controls will inevitably apply to the business.  When the law 
finally catches up to the business, regulatory scrutiny might be more 
searching or comprehensive than that practiced in established fields.  A 
good example of this phenomenon might be the introduction of websites 
such as Facebook or Twitter.  In very little time, entrepreneurs created an 
entirely new web industry based upon social networking.  Initially the 
target of few specialized regulations, increased attention from news media 
has brought great public scrutiny.  The result has been legislators and 
regulators who struggle to catch up with the advances of the industry.
116
 
Not all of the costs involved with regulation, however, necessarily fall 
hardest upon the smallest firms.  Consider the perspective of a regulator 
with a broad mandate and limited budget.  This regulator wants to further 
the mandate as much as possible within the confines of available funds.  
The regulator is a kind of entrepreneur in her own right, using her 
discretion to maximize regulatory returns relative to costs. 
Given a regulator‘s incentives and limitations, small businesses may 
be the least interesting target for regulatory scrutiny.  Small businesses tend 
to have the smallest non-compliance issues in absolute terms.  For example, 
assume that a small business fails to remediate pollution emissions that are 
thirty percent over the maximum, due to inadequate controls.  This business 
might be a less attractive target than a business many times its size who 
fails to remediate by only ten percent.  However, it is the much larger 
business that, in absolute terms, may release more harmful pollutants into 
the air.  If the regulator‘s goal is to reduce as many illegal pollutants as 
possible, then the larger business is the optimal target, even though the 
small business might be a more flagrant violator.  Small businesses might 
be able to get away with more brazen violations because the absolute value 
of the damage remains diminished. 
Small businesses also may be more difficult to detect and isolate.
117
  In 
an industry that might have hundreds, if not thousands, of small businesses, 
the new venture that skirts regulatory standards might easily be overlooked 
amongst the sheer number of rival enterprises.  A small business that has an 
otherwise clean slate can readily blend into the regulatory scenery and 
ignore scrutiny even after repeated violations. 
Small firms may also not be ideal public relations targets.  Agencies 
 
 116. See, e.g., Daniel B. Garrie et al., Data Protection: The Challenges Facing Social 
Networking, 6 B.Y.U. INT‘L L. & MGMT. REV. 127, 128 (2010) (noting in a global context 
that, ―[a]s social networking technology has raced forward, it has left corresponding 
legislation in the dust. . . . [D]ata protection laws have remained sorely inadequate to protect 
personal information in the social networking environment.‖); Lisa Thomas & Robert 
Newman, Social Networking and Blogging: The New Legal Frontier, 9 J. MARSHALL 
INTELLECTUAL PROP. L. 500 (2009). 
 117. Sommers & Cole, supra note 113, at 26. 
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have limited budgets and are subject to the will of the legislative entity that 
funds them.  Savvy regulators might respond to such pressures by 
enforcing rules against the most visible or notoriously-perceived violators 
rather than those firms that are actually committing the greatest harm.  
State regulators, for example, might have an incentive to challenge 
companies with only a token state presence relative to their broader 
operations. 
Small businesses by contrast, are rarely so visible or notorious that 
they would generate public relations rewards for the agency that scrutinizes 
them.  These small businesses are also more likely to be able to assert that 
most or all of the jobs they offer are located within a particular state.  The 
implication is that those in-state jobs would be threatened if legal action 
commences against them.  A small business entrepreneur might even make 
a more sympathetic figure.  He can present himself as a ‗regular guy‘ who 
is just trying to get ahead in a big business world and who is unfairly 
scrutinized by a massive government bureaucracy. 
C.  Attitudes of Small Business Owners Toward Regulation 
Small business owners have expressed significant concerns about the 
impact of regulation on their business operations.  A survey of nearly two 
hundred small business owners in the Midwest revealed that 81.1% 
believed regulatory compliance indirectly added costs to their business and 
66.3% believed that regulations added direct costs to their product.
118
  A 
majority of owners (65.3%) believed that government regulation impedes 
the progress of their business overall.
119
  Approximately half of respondents 
reported that government regulation impacts their motivation to continue as 
a small business owner.
120
  While a majority of respondents reported no 
contact with public officials, those that did reported both positive and 
negative experiences.
121
  Median annual compliance costs to regulation 
were estimated at $2500, representing between five and ten percent of sales 
for most of the sampled companies.
122
  These numbers appear to be self-
reported
123
 and may represent a tendency toward inflated estimates of the 
costs of regulation.
124
  However, it is no less important to note that at least 
 
 118. Donald F. Kuratko, Jeffrey S. Hornsby & Douglas W. Naffziger, The Adverse 
Impact of Public Policy on Microenterprises: An Exploratory Study of Owners’ Perceptions, 
4 J. DEVELOPMENTAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP 81, 86 (1999). 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 86–87. 
 121. Id. at 88. 
 122. Id. at 81. 
 123. Id. at 88.  The information was obtained as a part of a thirty-six item questionnaire.  
Id. at 85. 
 124. This overreaction has been observed in various business-related fields.  See Robert 
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the perception of small business owners is that regulation is a significant 
impediment to efficient operations. 
Because small business owners are often already overtaxed and find 
themselves facing an already complex legal environment, their negative 
reactions to further regulatory constraints is not surprising.  What is 
perhaps unexpected is how strongly these negative attitudes resonate and 
how vast the gulf between a regulator and small business leader might be. 
Cook and Barry conducted thirty-one interviews with small business 
executives across an array of industries to learn about their attitudes toward 
regulation and regulators.
125
  Transcripts were produced from interviews 
with these executives, who led companies ranging from eighteen to 380 
employees, all located in upstate New York.
126
  The transcripts yielded 
hundreds of pages of data.
127
 
The results were unequivocal and striking.  The authors explained 
that, ―[f]rom the first interview to the last, it was apparent that small 
business Chief Executive Officers (―CEOs‖) considered the public policy 
arena extremely confusing and complex.‖
128
  Executives would often 
describe regulations as ―clear as mud‖ or ask, ―Where did this come from?‖ 
and conclude that regulation was not based on reality.
129
 
Executives viewed themselves not as participants in an unpleasant but 
necessary regulatory regime, but as soldiers in a long-standing war against 
the government.
130
  This war was ―filled with turf disputes, shootouts, 
fierce battle campaigns, serious injuries, dashed hopes, and occasional tales 
 
C. Bird & John D. Knopf, Do Disability Laws Impair Firm Performance?, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 
145 (2010) (finding a surprisingly large change in fixed asset purchases by firms when a 
state adopted a disability accommodation requirement into its state law); Stephen J. Choi, 
The Unfounded Fear of Regulation S: Empirical Evidence on Offshore Securities Offerings, 
50 DUKE L.J. 663 (2000) (providing empirical evidence regarding the risks of security 
regulation compared to inflated market reactions); Lauren B. Edelman, Steven E. Abraham 
& Howard S. Erlanger, Professional Construction of Law: The Inflated Threat of Wrongful 
Discharge, 26 LAW & SOC‘Y REV. 47, 80 (1992) (finding that ―there seems to be significant 
albeit not conclusive evidence that employers‘ responses to wrongful discharge doctrine are 
in large part a result of constructions of the legal environment by the personnel and legal 
professions, which significantly overstate the risks of wrongful discharge doctrine to 
employers.‖); Michael D. Weiss, Note, The Poor Tax Revisited: The Effects of Shifting the 
Burden of Investigating Drug Crimes to Lenders, 70 TEX. L. REV. 717, 722 (1992) (noting 
that banks will likely overreact to regulation involving government seizure of illicit monies 
because of their inherent aversion to risk). 
 125. Shaping the External Environment, supra note 111, at 322. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 324–25. 
 129. Id. at 325. 
 130. Id. at 325–26.  The military metaphor, the authors write, was ―the most commonly 
used method of organizing and making sense of public policy information.‖  Id. at 326. 
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  This attitude may influence why lobbyists hired by 
businesses are commonly known as ―hired guns.‖
132
 
An attitude of despair and frustration also permeated the interviews.  
CEOs are typically confident by nature,
133
 but these interviews revealed 
leaders who were hesitant and uncertain about influencing the regulatory 
environment.
134
  CEO interviews were often punctuated with remarks like 
―small firms never win.‖
135
  One executive even lamented about being 
―very damn discouraged . . . [and] frankly . . . ready to throw in the towel,‖ 
over what he perceived as frivolous legal rules.
136
  Interviewees generally 
believed that government policies had such a strong influence that they 
could be responsible for the long-term failure of the organization.
137
  Such 
responses reveal that regulation was a most uncomfortable and emotional 
subject for the interviewed subjects. 
Little good can come from such strongly negative and emotional 
responses, and this attitude permeated the decision making process of the 
organization.  Some firms ―defended‖ themselves against regulatory 
encroachment by avoiding compliance, denying non-compliance had 
occurred when challenged, and hoping to be overlooked due to sheer 
numbers.
138
  Even fewer viewed the relationship with government as a 
potentially ―win/win‖ relationship.
139
  Instead, government officials were 
perceived as the ―town bad guys‖ whom executives could never ―run out of 
town.‖
140
  Businesses tended only to react when regulations had already 
made extensive inroads into company operations.
141
 
Predictably, the interviews showed that meetings with regulators were 
unproductive.  These meetings widened rather than reduced rifts between 
 
 131. Id. 
 132. See, e.g., Anita S. Krishnakumar, Towards a Madisonian, Interest-Group-Based, 
Approach to Lobbying Regulation, 58 ALA. L. REV. 513, 527 (2007) (using the term); Ron 
Smith, Compelled Cost Disclosure of Grass Roots Lobbying Expenses: Necessary 
Government Voyeurism or Chilled Political Speech?, 6 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 115, 132 
(1996) (using the term). 
 133. James R. Hines, Jr., Jill R. Horwitz & Austin Nichols, The Attack on Nonprofit 
Status: A Charitable Assessment, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1179, 1192 (2010) (noting for the 
purpose of distinguishing between for-profit and non-for-profit leaders that, ―[o]wners and 
executives of for-profit firms generally receive performance-based compensation, which 
both motivates high levels of attention and effort and attracts managers who are confident in 
their capabilities.‖). 
 134. Shaping the External Environment, supra note 111, at 326. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 328. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
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regulators and business owners.
142
  Regulators and businesspeople met only 
when one side wanted something from the other.  This encouraged a 
defensive rather than a collaborative posture,
143
 whereby each side second-
guessed the other and avoided concessions.  These meetings yielded few 
productive results.  Overall, CEOs surveyed in the study exhibited strongly 
negative attitudes toward regulation. 
The attitudes expressed in this study differ significantly from the more 
moderate responses found by Kuratko and co-authors.
144
  Thus, the 
methodology of the CEO study is worth noting because it may have 
influenced its finding of graphic results.  Unlike the prior work, which used 
questionnaires,
145
 this study used in-depth interviews of thirty-one 
executives from twenty-seven firms lasting approximately ninety minutes 
each.
146
  The authors also observed nine trade association meetings having 
a government relations focus.
147
  Also unlike the prior work, this paper 
focused primarily on attempts by executives to influence the public policy 
process.  These lengthy interviews may have provided a sense of comfort to 
the interviewees, allowing them to express themselves more freely to the 
interviewer and voice problems with the business.  Trade association 
meetings that were observed may have had a similar effect.  The 
immoderate responses may also be a product of overall frustration as much 
as specific problems with regulation. 
Justified or not, the belligerent attitude of these business leaders likely 
exacerbates the problem of unwanted regulatory influence even further.  
Indeed, their behavior may encourage the very regulatory environment they 
want so strongly to prevent.  It is possible that policy makers, presumably 
already suspicious of business motives, engaged in defensive behaviors of 
their own.  One strategy, the authors of the study surmise, is that 
policymakers kept legislative language deliberately obtuse in order to avoid 
clear impact calculations that businesses could use to defeat or repeal the 
legislation.
148
  It is questionable whether obtuseness in legislative language 
arose solely or even primarily from defensive motives.  Among the many 
reasons might be that the written word is simply an insufficient medium for 
 
 142. Id. at 326. 
 143. See Tia Henderson, The Foundation to Collaborate: Understanding the Role of 
Participant Interests 325 (2010) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Portland State University) 
(stating that ―when people are mistrustful, they engage in defensive behavior that 
encourages positions and distributive tactics.‖ (citing DEAN G. PRUITT, NEGOTIATION 
BEHAVIOR (1981))) 
 144. Kuratko, Hornsby & Naffziger, supra note 118. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Shaping the External Environment, supra note 111, at 322. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. at 327. 
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legislators to ever draft a statute that is perfectly unambiguous.
149
  
However, the point behind this conclusion is an important one.  Policy 
makers and regulators may react negatively or positively depending on the 
posture of the regulated parties. 
Further aggravating the problem is lack of notice or interest for 
government programs designed to aid small businesses or alleviate the 
regulatory burden.  When government agencies offer programs to assist or 
support small enterprises, they often become invisible to these entities.  In 
one study, the author examined the effectiveness of government export 
assistance programs for businesses and discovered a general lack of 
awareness that such programs even existed.
150
  Another study reported a 
similar lack of awareness of technology transfer assistance programs 
available to local manufacturers.
151
  When small firms learn of such 
programs, they often view these programs with suspicion rather than 
appreciation.  An investigation of business-owner attitudes towards 
government involvement on a range of issues revealed that small business 
owners were largely unconvinced that government could deliver on 
promised assistance.
152
  Almost half of small business owners surveyed 
believed that government should not be involved in job creation. 
Ultimately, most CEOs of small businesses did not even consider 
involving themselves in a public policy issue until that issue directly 
impacted their businesses.
153
  Overall, few small business owners surveyed 
took an active role in the public policy arena.
154
  When these few owners 
attempted to influence public policy makers to promote more business-
friendly policies, these efforts usually failed.
155
  It is little wonder why 
small business owners are so frustrated with what they perceive as an 
oppressive, inexplicable, and hostile regulatory climate in the United 
States. 
 
 149. Jonathan D. Andrews, Reconciling the Split: Affording Reasonable Accommodation 
to Employees: “Regarded As” Disabled Under the ADA—An Exercise in Statutory 
Interpretation, 110 PENN. ST. L. REV. 977, 994 (2006) (stating that ―[l]atent statutory 
ambiguities can arise any time after drafting. The English language is far too complex for 
legislators to draft a perfectly unambiguous statute; not to mention the fact that the 
meanings of words change over time.‖). 
 150. A.H. Moini, Small Firms Exporting: How Effective are Government Export 
Assistance Programs?, 36 J. SM. BUS. MGMT. 1, 1 (1998). 
 151. John Masten, G. Bruce Hartman, & Arief Safari, Small Business Strategic Planning 
and Technology Transfer: The Use of Publicly Supported Technology Assistance Agencies, 
33 J. SM. BUS. MGMT. 26, 26 (1995). 
 152. Kelly C. Strong & Michael Winchell, A Comparison of Small and Large Business 
Managers’ Attitudes Toward Innovation and the Role of Government in Promoting 
Technology, 6 J. SM. BUS. STRATEGY 109, 119 (1995). 
 153. Shaping the External Environment, supra note 111, at 329. 
 154. Id. at 328. 
 155. Id. at 326. 
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IV.  STRATEGIES FOR SMALL BUSINESSES IN NAVIGATING THE RFA 
Learning to think strategically over the long term in a way that is both 
realistic and effective is a crucial skill for small businesses.  The most 
competitive small businesses will acknowledge the need to take regulations 
into account as a business concern, in the same way that they acknowledge 
other issues that may be beyond their expertise, but which significantly 
affect their chances of success. 
While the RFA mandates some amount of agency attentiveness to 
small business‘ concerns, its limitations have been well documented, as 
described above.  In order to increase transparency and improve real-time 
communication between small firms and agencies throughout the 
rulemaking process, small firms must have a stronger voice in the 
rulemaking process.  The SBA plays some role in training and policing the 
agencies in small firm sensitivity, but small firms can and should also take 
the issue of maximizing RFA benefits into their own hands.  They can do 
so both directly (in terms of specific exemptions and adjustments to 
regulations) and indirectly (in terms of improved long-term relationships 
with relevant agencies). 
But how can these small businesses better communicate their interests 
to relevant agencies, when so many of them are already under enormous 
financial pressure simply to turn a profit?  Often these small businesses will 
put regulatory matters at the bottom of their priority list.  There are several 
ways for small businesses to contribute meaningfully to that process, rather 
than coming to the table too late to effect change.  These contributions 
include taking advantage of technological advances and federal imperatives 
to improve the accessibility of the rulemaking process as well as finding 
strength in numbers through trade associations and other means.  These 
strategies can help improve the substantive dialogue between agencies and 
firms, creating or strengthening the working relationship between them 
and, presumably, leading to a more nuanced appreciation of small firm 
concerns in the rulemaking process.  We will next describe some of the 
most promising routes for small firms to take. 
A. Make Strategic Use of the Online Open Government Initiatives. 
Small businesses can benefit from recent mandates compelling federal 
agencies to increase opportunities for public participation in the rulemaking 
process.  These mandates require agencies to take several steps that have 
ancillary benefits for small businesses.  For example, because agencies are 
now required to put their information online in a searchable format, small 
businesses are better able to find information about, and give feedback on, 
potential rules that may affect their operations during the rulemaking 
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process.  While these increased transparency mandates are designed to 
benefit the public in general, small businesses can use the resulting flow of 
information competitively to reap greater and more concrete benefits than 
other stakeholders. 
One of President Obama‘s first actions upon taking office was to 
direct federal agencies to make better and more extensive use of the 
internet in order to improve transparency, participation and collaboration in 
agency action.
156
  An Open Government Directive (―Directive‖) issued in 
December 2009 provided more detailed instructions to agencies about 
implementing these standards.
157
  A comprehensive overview of the results 
of the Open Government Initiative, as it is called, was established through 
the White House website.
158
  This website features an ―Innovations 
Gallery‖ that showcases some of what the Administration considers the 
most outstanding ways in which agencies have improved transparency, 
participation and collaboration. 
The Open Government Initiative increases the potential for small firm 
interaction with government agencies in several ways.  For example, the 
Directive required agencies to ―publish information online in an open 
format that can be retrieved, downloaded, indexed and searched by 
commonly used web search applications.‖
159
  The Directive also ordered 
each federal agency to develop a comprehensive Open Government Plan to 
meet the terms of the President‘s mandate by April 2010.  The Open 
Government Plans were also to include ―[d]etails as to how your agency is 
complying with transparency initiative guidance such as . . . eRulemaking . 
. . .‖
160
  They were also required to include ―descriptions of and links to 
appropriate websites where the public can engage in existing participatory 
processes of your agency‖ and ―proposals for new feedback mechanisms, 
including innovative tools and practices that create new and easier methods 
for public engagement.‖
161
  Through these requirements, agencies were 
compelled both to make it easier for stakeholders to find existing ways of 
engaging in agency processes, such as rulemaking, and to expand the 
opportunities for such engagement. 
The Directive further required each agency to create an ―Open 
Government Webpage‖ on their agency‘s website, to be maintained and 
updated ―in a timely fashion.‖
162
  Each Open Government Webpage was to 
 
 156. Memorandum from President Barack Obama, supra note 6. 
 157. Memorandum from Peter R. Orszag, supra note 7. 
 158. Open Government Initiative, THE WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/open 
(last visited Feb. 1, 2011).  The site‘s Open Gov Blog serves as a news feed to highlight 
agency improvements and awards that further the Open Government Initiative‘s goals. 
 159. Memorandum from Peter R. Orszag, supra note 7, at 2. 
 160. Id. at 8. 
 161. Id. at 9. 
 162. Id. at 2. 
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―incorporate a mechanism for the public to:  i. Give feedback on and 
assessment of the quality of published information; ii. Provide input about 
which information to prioritize for publication; and iii. Provide input on the 
agency‘s Open Government Plan.‖
163
 
The Open Government Initiative bodes well for small businesses.  The 
new opportunities for public input, once developed and implemented by the 
agencies, offer small firms another means of communicating with agencies 
about their interests and increase accessibility to those agencies.  They 
require agencies to create new ways for both the small businesses they 
regulate as well as the general public to voice concerns about proposed or 
existing regulations, even if the agencies do not ultimately act on those 
concerns. 
Small firms can use these initiatives to their advantage in several 
specific ways.  For example, a small firm might periodically perform a 
search of an agency‘s website to determine whether there are any proposed 
regulations relevant to its business.  Prior to the Directive, a small firm had 
no assurance that any of an agency‘s proposed rules and any related agency 
discussions would be searchable online, let alone all of them.  Before the 
release of Open Government Plans, small firms might not have known 
what participatory processes an agency offered in the first place.  Small 
firms now have much greater opportunities to (1) find out how to interact 
with agencies, (2) take part in developing new means of interacting with 
agencies, and (3) learn what substantive matters potentially affecting their 
businesses are on the table for possible regulatory action by the agencies 
that affect them the most. 
B. Engage Agencies Through Social Media and Dedicated Websites. 
Small firms can also use social media to interact with agencies to an 
extent that was unimaginable even ten years ago, let alone in 1980 when 
the RFA was passed.  According to a recent GAO report, twenty-two of the 
twenty-four major federal agencies had a presence on Facebook, YouTube 
and/or Twitter.
164
  Agencies also use blogs, wikis, podcasts and mashups to 
convey information about agency activity.
165
 
Similarly, most small firms have some presence on the internet.  
According to the Small Business Success Index published by Network 
 
 163. Id. at 3.  Each agency is also directed to ―respond to public input received on its 
Open Government Webpage on a regular basis.‖  Id.  The vagueness inherent in the terms 
―respond‖ and ―regular‖ do not provide small firms with as much assurance of a timely and 
substantive response as supporters of small firm interests might want. 
 164. U.S. GOV‘T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-872T, CHALLENGES IN FEDERAL 
AGENCIES‘ USE OF WEB 2.0 TECHNOLOGIES (2010). 
 165. Id. at 4. 
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Solutions, LLC and the University of Maryland‘s Smith School of 
Business, sixty-seven percent of small firms surveyed either have a website 
or plan to have one within two years, and twenty-four percent of small 
firms surveyed already use social media.
166
  At the very least, most small 
business owners have an email account and the ability to interact online.  
Using the internet, and social media in particular, to communicate with 
federal agencies offers the potential of streamlining and facilitating 
interaction in a way that benefits both the regulators and the regulated.  
Some of this interaction is happening already.  The SBA received an 
enthusiastic response when it started using social media.  The SBA‘s 
Facebook pages and Twitter feeds for its regional offices were activated in 
the third week of December 2010.  Two weeks later, there were over 2500 




Another underused innovation supporting the goals of the RFA is the 
Regulations.gov website.  This website, part of the eRulemaking initiative, 
allows users to ―[s]earch for‖ and access ―a proposed rule, final rule or 
Federal Register (FR) notice,‖ ―[s]ubmit a comment on a regulation or on 
another comment,‖ ―[s]ign up for e-mail alerts about a specific regulation‖ 
and ―[s]ubscribe to RSS feeds by agency of newly posted FR notices.‖
168
  
The site provides access to information from nearly 300 federal agencies. 
While the Directive does encourage agency responsiveness to small 
firms and other stakeholders who benefit from increased transparency and 
communication, its potential benefits are greatest when a small firm can 
target the specific agency or agencies that most directly affect its 
operations.  The Regulations.gov website, in contrast, allows public 
searches of proposed and current regulations from all major government 
agencies.  As the website explains, 
In the past, if members of the public were interested in 
commenting on a regulation, they would have to know the 
sponsoring agency, when it would be published, review it in a 
 
 166. Rockbridge Assoc., The State of Small Business Report:  June 2010 Survey of Small 
Business Success, NETWORK SOLUTIONS 2 (July 2010), 
http://www.networksolutions.com/smallbusiness/wp-
content/files/Network_Solutions_Small_Business_Success_Index.pdf. 
 167. Jen Williams, The Small Business Administration Engages Social Media, PRONET 
ADVERTISING (Jan. 5, 2011), http://www.pronetadvertising.com/articles/the-small-business-
administration-engages-social-media.html. 
 168. About Us, REGULATIONS.GOV, http://www.regulations.gov/#!aboutUs (last visited 
Feb. 2, 2011).  The eRulemaking initiative was established in October 2002, and launched 
the Regulations.gov website in 2003 ―to enable citizens to search, view and comment on 
regulations issued by the U.S. government.‖  eRulemaking Program, REGULATIONS.GOV, 
http://www.regulations.gov/#!aboutProgram (last visited Feb. 2, 2011).  The EPA has 
served as the managing partner of the eRulemaking program since its inception.  Id. 
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reading room, then struggle through a comment process specific 
to each agency.  Today using Regulations.gov, the public can 




Using this website, small firms can search broadly for proposals that 
could affect their operations without limiting themselves to specific 
agencies, which could be especially advantageous for small firms that 
know relatively little about the rulemaking process and/or the federal 
agencies most likely to regulate their specific operation. 
As part of the Open Government Initiative, the Regulations.gov 
website was retooled to create the Regulations.gov Exchange, which 
explicitly invites public comment and participation in the rulemaking 
process and on improvements to the Regulations.gov website itself.  For 
example, one well-received proposal was the organization of regulatory 
information by regulatory category, such as Defense, Energy, Environment 
or Health Care.  The site notes that an advantage to such an organizational 
scheme would be that ―rulemakings of federal agencies [would] 
become more compatible with commonly used media categories, 
providing real-world perspectives about rules.‖
170
  An unusual feature 
of the Regulations.gov Exchange (unusual, at least, for a government 
website) is the star-rating feature that allows users to evaluate the 
usefulness of the site‘s features.
171
 
While most agency usage of social media is designed to stream 
information one way—from the agency to the general public, thus 
ostensibly meeting the goal of transparency—social media offers small 
firms a valuable new way to convey their concerns and interests back to the 
agencies whose regulations can affect every aspect of their operations. 
C. Leverage the Lobbying Power of Trade Associations. 
Trade associations have enormous potential to help small businesses 
make their best strategic use of the RFA.  Trade associations are 
professional groups that bring firm representatives together to share 
information and concerns about their industry.  They often act on behalf of 
an industry group to promote the association members‘ interests to the 
 
 169. eRulemaking Program, REGULATIONS.GOV, 
http://www.regulations.gov/#!aboutProgram (last visited Feb. 2, 2011). 
 170. Regulated Sector Categories, REGULATIONS.GOV, 
http://www.regulations.gov/exchange/topic/exchange/discussion/regulated-sector-categories 
(last visited April 8, 2011). 
 171. See, e.g., Exchange Discussions, REGULATIONS.GOV, 
http://www.regulations.gov/exchange/topic/exchange (last visited Feb. 2, 2011) (allowing 
users to evaluate the usefulness of the site‘s features through a star-rating feature). 
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government at the federal and/or state level.  With a centralized 
communication channel to small firms in a particular industry already in 
place, trade associations could serve as a critical point of contact for 
agencies seeking input from the smaller firms in a given industry. 
Two kinds of trade associations exist to help small businesses.  The 
first are industry-specific associations, which offer benefits to both large 
and small firms within a given industry.  The second are trade associations 
that operate to help meet the needs of small firms  in general.  These 
include the National Small Business Association (NSBA), the National 
Association of Women Business Owners (NAWBO), which assists women 
entrepreneurs, and the National Federation of Independent Businesses 
(NFIB), the largest lobbying organization for small businesses in the 
country.  Small firms can make strategic use of both kinds of associations. 
One of the most common ways for small businesses to leverage the 
power of trade associations has been through litigation.  Trade associations 
have taken the lead in several lawsuits challenging new regulations because 
the promulgating agency failed to comply with the RFA requirements.  In 
one case, the International Franchise Association and a number of other 
national trade associations succeeded in getting a Northern District of 
California court to enjoin the Department of Homeland Security‘s ―no-
match‖ rule, which prohibited employers from hiring or retaining workers 
whose names did not match their Social Security number records.  Their 
complaint alleged that the federal government did not assess the impact of 
this rule on small businesses as required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 
nor did it prove that there was no less burdensome alternative available.
172
  
After nearly two years of litigation, the Department of Homeland Security 
eventually rescinded the rule.
173
 
While trade associations have great potential to help small businesses 
communicate with regulators, they may bring disadvantages as well.  One 
potential obstacle to the use of trade associations is the perception that they 
are deaf to the concerns of small businesses.  In some industries, small 
businesses have been reluctant to engage in trade association activity 
because they believe that larger businesses, with the capacity to devote 
greater resources to funding and leading such associations, dominate or 
distort the agenda.  While some commentators have pointed out that trade 
associations are often dominated by large companies, leaving the concerns 
of small businesses underrepresented,
174
 this is not always the case.  In any 
event, there is far less risk that a large business will dominate a trade 
 
 172. David French, IFA and Industry Groups Sue to Stop “No-Match” Rule: Firing 
Workers Required Under Immigration “No-Match” Rule, FRANCHISING WORLD, Oct. 2007, 
at 39. 
 173. 74 FED. REG. 51, 447 (OCT. 7, 2009). 
 174. Holman, supra note 1, at 1124. 
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association‘s lobbying agenda for trade associations specializing in the 
interests of small firms, such as the NSBA.  The NSBA, for example, only 
gives voting rights to small firm members.
175
 
D.  Voice Concerns Through the R3 Process. 
One of the easiest ways for small firms to register concerns about 
particular laws is to take advantage of the Regulatory Review & Reform 
Initiative, also known as the r3 process.  Through this annual process, the 
SBA‘s Office of Advocacy invites small firms to single out regulations for 
review and possible revision.  As part of the process, the Office of 
Advocacy solicits suggestions from small businesses at the end of every 
calendar year.  A few months later, the Office publishes the ―Top Ten 
Rules for Review and Reform.‖  In order to track agency progress in 
reviewing these rules, the Office posts an update on their status every six 
months.
176
  The Office of Advocacy has described the r3 process as ―a tool 
for small business stakeholders‖ to help ―identify and address existing 
federal regulations that should be revised because they are ineffective, 
duplicative, or out of date.‖
177
  The r3 process is not just a vehicle for 
complaints.  It also allows small businesses to engage more creatively with 
the government by suggesting positive regulatory reforms. 
Despite the visibility and responsiveness of the r3 process, relatively 
few small firms have taken advantage of it.  The 2009 ―Top Ten Rules for 
Review and Reform‖ were chosen from a field of only thirty-eight 
nominations, fewer than half of the eighty nominations that the SBA 
received in 2008.
178
  While it is not clear why more small firms do not take 
advantage of this process, it is likely that many simply do not know about 
it.  Given the attitudes of small firms discussed in Part III above, it is also 
possible that many small firms lack the information they would need to 
 
 175. While the NSBA technically accepts businesses of any size as members, only those 
members with 500 or fewer employees are allowed to vote on issues, according to Patrick 
Post, its Vice President of Membership.  Mr. Post notes that 98% of the NSBA‘s members 
have 15 or fewer employees, and 37% have 5 or fewer employees.  Interview with Patrick 
Post, Vice President of NSBA Membership (Dec. 15, 2010). 
 176. Press Release, U.S. Small Bus. Admin. Office of Advocacy, Advocacy Commits to 
Long-Term r3 Initiative (July 30, 2008), available at http://archive.sba.gov/advo/press/08-
20.html. 
 177. Small Business Regulatory Review and Reform Initiative, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN. 
OFFICE OF ADVOCACY (Oct. 1, 2010), http://archive.sba.gov/advo/r3/. 
 178. Press Release, U.S. Small Bus. Admin. Office of Advocacy, Two New Regulations 
Added to 2009 r3 Top 10 Rules for Review and Reform, (Feb. 27, 2009), available at 
http://www.sba.gov/advocacy/809/12400; Advocacy Commits To Long-Term r3 Initiative, 
supra note 176.  Low participation rates may have influenced the Office of Advocacy‘s 
decision in early 2011 to put the r3 program on temporary hiatus. Telephone conversation 
with Charles Maresca, Director of Interagency Operations (Feb. 8, 2011). 
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take part in the process, such as the specific name of a regulation affecting 
them or the information necessary to suggest an affirmative change.  A 
third possibility is that some small firms simply do not want to engage with 
the SBA at all. 
V.  STRATEGIES TO IMPROVE AGENCY RESPONSIVENESS TO SMALL 
BUSINESSES 
While small businesses can do much to achieve their own goals in 
working with regulators, regulators also have new means to help them 
achieve the RFA‘s mandate of sensitivity to small businesses‘ concerns.  
The original terms of the RFA asked the agencies to take the considerations 
of small businesses into account during the rulemaking process, but 
provided little direction as to how agencies might learn what the true 
constraints and concerns of these businesses were.  Federal agencies can 
vastly improve their understanding of and responsiveness to small 
businesses, as the RFA originally compelled them to do, by adopting some 
of the reforms suggested below.  None of them require a significant 
investment of additional resources, and the potential benefits for both 
regulators and the smaller firms that they affect could be tremendous. 
A. Consider Potential Advantages of Adapting State Models. 
In an effort to spread the gospel of regulatory flexibility from federal 
to state government, the SBA‘s Office of Advocacy first drafted model 
legislation for state versions of the RFA in 2002.  Since that time, 
according to the SBA, ―37 state legislatures have considered regulatory 
flexibility legislation, and 22 states have implemented regulatory flexibility 
via Executive Order or legislation.‖
179
  The number of states adopting some 
version of a regulatory flexibility law has grown over time. 
A closer examination of these state statutes, however, shows a wide 
variation in their potential benefit for small businesses.  For example, while 
Arizona law establishes fairly comprehensive provisions that mirror most 
aspects of the RFA, the Alabama laws cited by the SBA as responsive to 
the needs of small businesses actually make no mention of, and compel no 
regulatory concern for, small businesses or entrepreneurs at all.
180
  Alaska‘s 
small business flexibility law was repealed effective January 1, 2009. 
 
 179. Small Business Regulatory Flexibility Model Legislation Initiative, U.S. SMALL 
BUS. ADMIN. OFFICE OF ADVOCACY, http://archive.sba.gov/advo/laws/law_modeleg.html 
(last visited Feb. 2, 2011). 
 180. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41–1035 (2010) (demonstrating Arizona‘s 
comprehensive statute applicable to small businesses); ALA. CODE §§ 41–22–23 (2010) 
(demonstrating Alabama‘s lack of regulation applicable to small businesses). 
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While many states have adopted a regulatory structure similar to the 
RFA, some states have added their own innovations designed to improve 
communication between agencies and small businesses.  In May 2009, for 
example, Connecticut augmented its own regulatory flexibility laws.  Like 
the RFA, Connecticut state law had already required agencies to estimate 
the cost of proposed regulations on small businesses and assess their likely 
impact before enacting them.  The new law, however, requires state 
agencies to go a step further by notifying the public about how to obtain 
copies of the new small business impact analysis and the regulatory 
flexibility analysis in advance of the public comment period for the 
proposed regulation.
181
  The fact that ninety-four percent of Connecticut‘s 
73,000 employers have fewer than one hundred employees underscores the 
importance of providing this notice to small businesses in the state.
182
 
Several states have created remarkably effective, low-cost options for 
improving their agencies‘ responsiveness to small business concerns.  The 
SBA itself highlighted certain state innovations in its 2007 publication, 
―State Guide to Regulatory Flexibility for Small Businesses,‖ a guide to the 
―best practices‖ state governments have adopted to improve regulatory 
flexibility for small firms.  The SBA also monitors state law developments 
on its website.  Why, one might ask, doesn‘t the federal government 
consider amending the RFA to incorporate some of the ―best practices‖ the 
SBA has identified among these state innovations? 
Many of the innovations created at the state level could be adapted by 
federal agencies.  One such innovation is email notification.  Rhode Island, 
for example, has created a Rules Tracker system that allows individuals to 
customize their email updates by specifying the agencies and keywords 
they want to monitor.  The Rules Tracker system is accessible from the 
home page for Rhode Island‘s rules and regulations database, where small 
businesses can complete a simple registration procedure.
183
  After 
registering for the service, users can choose to receive notifications from 
any or all of the state‘s regulatory agencies, the state police, the Secretary 
of State, the Attorney General and other government divisions.  Users can 
also specify the keywords for which they want to receive alerts and choose 
whether they want to receive alerts on a daily, weekly or monthly basis. 
Similarly, Colorado‘s state government website enables businesses to 
sign up for free email alerts to notify them whenever a state agency 
proposes a rule change involving certain keywords that the businesses have 
 
 181. Connecticut Is Latest New England State To Strengthen Regulatory Flexibility for 
Small Business, supra note 36. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Rules Tracker, STATE OF RHODE ISLAND, available at 
http://www.rules.state.ri.us/rules/freshregs/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2011) (simple registration 
required). 
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  Under the Colorado Administrative Procedure Act, state 
agencies must file copies of proposed rules and amendments to existing 
rules with a central agency, which then generates an automatic email to 
interested parties who have registered for this free service.
185
  The sign-up 
form is a single page on which small business owners and other 
stakeholders identify the general subjects of rulemaking that they are 
interested in.
186
  Other states with comparable internet tools that promote 
the transparency of the rulemaking process include Alaska, Illinois, 
Kentucky, Nebraska, Virginia and Wisconsin. 
Another state innovation that federal agencies might adopt is the 
creation of small business regulatory review boards.  In Hawaii, for 
example, the Small Business Regulatory Review Board consists of current 
and former small business owners appointed by the Governor, and meets 
monthly.
187
  Its duties include commenting to regulatory agencies on the 
impact of existing and proposed regulation on small businesses, and 
reviewing requests from small business owners for review of state and 
county administrative rules.
188
  The Board has also set up sub-committees 
to work with individual agencies between monthly meetings, increasing the 
potential for more focused and productive relationships with those 
agencies.
189
  Missouri has a Small Business Regulatory Fairness Board 
serving much the same purpose, as do Oklahoma and South Carolina.
190
 
While a single review board obviously would be impractical for the 
federal government, major federal agencies could consider developing 
similar review boards, consisting of current and/or past small business 
owners whose businesses are (or were) directly affected by that agency‘s 
rules.  If the board consisted of volunteers, as they do in the Hawaii model, 
the cost could be minimal as well. 
Other states maintain periodically updated lists of proposed 
 
 184. U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN. OFFICE OF ADVOCACY, STATE GUIDE TO REGULATORY 
FLEXIBILITY 17 (2007), http://archive.sba.gov/advo/laws/rfa_stateguide07.pdf. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Sign-up Form, COLO. OFFICIAL STATE WEB PORTAL, OFFICE OF POLICY, RESEARCH 
AND REGULATORY REFORM, http://www.dora.state.co.us/pls/real/sb121_web.signup_form 
(last visited Feb. 2, 2011). 
 187. Small Business Regulatory Review Board, HAW. DEP‘T OF BUS., ECON. DEV. & 
TOURISM, http://hawaii.gov/dbedt/business/start_grow/small-business-info/sbrrb (last visited 
Feb. 2, 2011). 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. 
 190. MO. SMALL BUS. REGULATORY FAIRNESS BD., http://www.sbrfb.ded.mo.gov/ (last 
visited Feb. 2, 2011); Small Business Advocacy, OKLA. DEP‘T OF COMMERCE, 
http://www.okcommerce.gov/Businesses-And-Employers/Small-Business-Advocacy (last 
visited Feb. 2, 2011); Small Business Resources, S.C. DEP‘T OF COMMERCE, 
http://sccommerce.com/business-services/business-services/small-business-resources (last 
visited Feb. 2, 2011). 
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regulations that may have an impact on small businesses.  Ohio, for 
example, posts a list that is updated weekly.
191
  In a variation of this type of 
service, California maintains a list of the agencies that ―frequently propose 
regulations that can have a major impact on small businesses,‖ with 




If federal agencies were required to develop similar outreach efforts, 
small businesses would be better able to stay informed about potential rule 
changes that could affect them.  This could be a relatively inexpensive and 
potentially effective measure for federal agencies to take when they are 
considering new rules. 
The effectiveness of state models may be limited, however, by 
unpredictable and inconsistent interpretations of what constitutes a ―small 
business.‖  State attempts to define ―small business‖ more clearly than the 
RFA does have met with mixed results.  In Vermont, for example, state law 
requires state agencies to consider the impact of proposed regulations on 
small businesses.
193
  A separate state law defines ―small business‖ as ―a 
business employing no more than twenty full-time employees.‖
194
  Vermont 
courts, however, have ruled that state agencies need not use that statutory 
definition when considering the impact of proposed regulations on small 
businesses;  instead, the agencies themselves may choose any definition of 
―small business‖ that is ―rational and effective‖ in light of the regulation at 
issue.  In Gasoline Marketers of Vermont, Inc. v. Agency of Natural 
Resources,
195
 the Supreme Court of Vermont rejected a challenge to a 
regulation that would have required gasoline stations to install vapor 
recovery systems on their pumps, but would have exempted gasoline 
stations with a throughput of 400,000 gallons or less from that requirement.  
The plaintiff challenged the regulation because it alleged that the agency 
failed to consider the impact on small businesses, as required by state law; 
throughput volume, they alleged, did not correlate with the size of the 
business.  According to the plaintiff, the agency had ―failed to identify 
which gas stations were small businesses, determine how many gas stations 
were small businesses, calculate what volume of gas they sold, and analyze 
the cost of compliance for them,‖ even though the information necessary to 
 
 191. Small Business Rules and Regulations, OHIO DEP‘T OF DEV., 
http://www.development.ohio.gov/Entrepreneurship/SBRegister1.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 
2011). 
 192. Small Business Advocate, CA.GOV, http://sba.ca.gov/index.php (last visited Feb. 2, 
2011). 
 193. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 832a (2011).  This law was enacted in 1985, five years after 
passage of the RFA.   
 194. Id. at § 801(b)(12).  This definition was also adopted in 1985, in the same session as 
Vermont‘s version of the RFA. 
 195. 739 A.2d 1230 (1999). 
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complete this analysis was readily available to the agency.
196
 
In siding with the agency, the Court noted that: 
[Small businesses] cannot demand that ANR use any particular 
methodology as opposed to another [to comply with state 
requirements].  Here, ANR‘s methodology was reasonable, both 
in minimizing the cost burden of compliance and maximizing 
attainment of environmental standards.  Given the purposes of 
the regulation, the throughput measure of small businesses was 
more relevant both in terms of economic impact . . . and efficacy 
of the regulations . . . . It would be illogical to forbid the agency 
from operating in a manner that was rational and effective.
197
 
In effect, the Gasoline Marketers of Vermont case made it impossible 
for small firms to demand that state agencies use the statutory definition of 
―small business,‖ suggesting instead that the agencies themselves were 
better equipped to decide how to define those interests than either the state 
legislature or the firms who actually held those interests.  This case 
suggests the potential complexity and likely challenge to any federal 
definition of ―small‖ business for RFA purposes. 
B.  Expand Small Business Offices Within Agencies. 
Another way for agencies to strengthen agency business partnerships 
is to dedicate resources specifically to helping small businesses and, 
crucially, to publicizing those efforts so that small businesses can take 
advantage of them.  Depending on the agency, it may make sense to create 
a commission or designate an ―in-house‖ representative dedicated to 
improving communication with small businesses. 
The FTC provides an example, albeit an imperfect one, of how an 
agency might dedicate resources to small business concerns.  Its Small 
Business Compliance Assistance Policy Statement describes various forms 
of assistance that the FTC makes available to help small businesses comply 
with truth-in-advertising laws.  The FTC also includes an expanding library 
of materials written especially for small businesses within the Business 
Guidance section of the FTC‘s website.  Finally, the agency invites small 
businesses to contact either the FTC headquarters or one of the agency‘s 
regional offices with specific inquiries about compliance.
198
  In practice, 
however, there is no particular group within the FTC that appears 
designated to receive inquiries from small businesses.  Given the typical 
 
 196. Id. at 1233 (emphasis added). 
 197. Id. at 1234-35. 
 198. Advertising FAQ’s: A Guide for Small Business, FED. TRADE COMM‘N BUREAU OF 
CONSUMER PROT. BUS. CTR.,  http://business.ftc.gov/documents/bus35-advertising-faqs-
guide-small-business (last visited Feb. 2, 2011). 
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entrepreneur‘s limited time and resources, she would likely find it hard to 
locate someone within the agency bureaucracy who was knowledgeable 
about, and sympathetic to, her unique needs and concerns. 
Similarly, the FDA‘s Center for Drug Evaluation and Research 
(CDER) offers focused support for small businesses.
199
  Unlike the FTC, 
however, the FDA has designated small business contacts in both its 
national headquarters and two of its five regional offices, which represent 
more than a third of the states as well as the US/Mexico border generally.
200
 
C.  Balance Small Business Concerns with Broader Impact. 
An important, but overlooked, area of concern is that some of the 
small business exemptions that the RFA has facilitated may be 
counterproductive in some respects by potentially undermining the broad 
purposes of the legislation they affect.  The SBA‘s 2007 report on the cost 
savings achieved by the RFA describes a number of examples of small 
businesses being excused from regulations whose overall social and 
environmental benefits might well exceed the short-term costs borne by 
affected small businesses.  Environmental impact is just one of many areas 
where this sort of undesirable trade-off might occur.  For example, the 
report noted that the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) had initially 
designated 18,031 square miles of critical habitat for the Canada Lynx.  In 
response to ―comments‖ by the SBA and various small businesses, 
however, the FWS ultimately designated only 1841 square miles of 
protected lynx habitat based on ―economic‖ and other factors, reducing its 
proposed conservation area by some ninety percent.  While the SBA report 
noted that the ―exclusion of these high-cost areas resulted in $919 million 
in cost savings,‖ the report did not analyze the resulting cost to the 
lynxes.
201
  Similarly, the FWS excluded private lands from a critical habitat 
designation for certain endangered minnows, in response to concerns 
voiced by small businesses, because of ―economic factors.‖
202
 
In assessing the RFA‘s cost savings to small businesses, the SBA does 
 
 199. See, e.g., Small Business Assistance: Contact, Organization & Meeting Information, 
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/SmallBusinessAssistance/ucm069
901.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2011) (providing information for small businesses relating to 
the development and approval process). 
 200. Small Business Contacts, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
http://www.fda.gov/ForIndustry/SmallBusinessAssistance/SmallBusinessRepresentatives/de
fault.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2011). 
 201. U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN. OFFICE OF ADVOCACY, REPORT ON THE REGULATORY 
FLEXIBILITY ACT FY 2007, 23 (2008), available at 
http://archive.sba.gov/advo/laws/flex/07regflx.pdf. 
 202. Id. 
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not appear to have quantified or even considered the potential longer-term 
costs that such tradeoffs may generate, let alone compared them to the 
estimated savings experienced by the small business owners.  In smoothing 
the path for small business owners, the government must not bulldoze over 
equally important, but perhaps less immediately quantifiable, broader 
concerns. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
While the economic significance of small businesses has only become 
more important since the RFA‘s introduction thirty years ago, the RFA has 
not met its promise of increasing regulatory flexibility to accommodate 
those businesses‘ concerns.  The RFA increased awareness among federal 
regulators that small businesses have unique concerns and that regulation 
must take those concerns into account in order to maximize effectiveness, 
but its shortcomings have undercut its effectiveness.  Instead, a new 
approach is needed.  An interactive and multifaceted approach that 
capitalizes on the reforms introduced by the Open Government Initiative to 
engage small businesses in a dialogue with regulators would generate many 
of the benefits that the RFA originally intended to convey. 
Understanding the unique legal, regulatory and practical challenges 
that small firms face is a critical first step toward realizing these potential 
gains.  Recent research demonstrates that small businesses have the 
capacity for greater political activity than might be expected, although they 
tend to lack the resources necessary for success using the traditional models 
of engaging with regulatory agencies.  Because small businesses are 
disproportionately burdened by regulation, they may be uniquely motivated 
to seek regulatory flexibility. 
Recent government directives increasing the transparency and 
participatory nature of regulation have the potential to serve small 
businesses well.  Small businesses have an unprecedented opportunity to 
make strategic use of these initiatives and to help bring about the kind of 
regulatory flexibility that the RFA fell short of achieving.  The most 
competitive small businesses will benefit significantly as a result.  There 
are also new strategies available to federal agencies, often modeled on 
innovations at the state level, for improving responsiveness to small 
businesses‘ concerns and overall efficiency. 
While the RFA sought to raise agency awareness of small businesses‘ 
concerns, it has not been sufficient to address those concerns effectively.  
Only recently have initiatives emerged at both the federal and state level 
that genuinely empower small firms to help reduce and reform the 
regulatory burdens on them.  By taking advantage of new directives and 
technology to help fill the gap left by the RFA and its subsequent 
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amendments, small firms can now interact with regulators to alleviate the 
pressure of the most burdensome rules.  These reforms are necessary.  
Without them, the possibility exists that thirty years later a new generation 
of scholars will hold a symposium titled, ―The RFA at 60,‖ and continue to 
wrestle with the same unresolved questions. 
